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The ARYAN PATH

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THE ARYAN PATH

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
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- (b) The study of ancient and modern religions, philosophies and sciences, and a demonstration of the importance of such study; and
- (c) The investigation of the unexplained laws of nature and the psychical powers latent in man.



हिरण्मयेन पात्रेण सत्यस्यापिहितं मुखम् ।

तत्त्वं पूषन्नपावृणु सत्यधर्माय दृष्टये ॥

—ईश, १५ (*Ishopanishad*, 15)

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THE SIGHT OF THE HEART

To live and reap experience, the mind needs breadth and depth and points to draw it towards the Diamond Soul [*Vajrasattva*, a title of the supreme Buddha, the "Lord of all Mysteries"]. Seek not those points in Maya's realm ; but soar beyond illusions, search the eternal and the changeless SAT, mistrusting fancy's false suggestions.

For mind is like a mirror ; it gathers dust while it reflects. It needs the gentle breezes of Soul-Wisdom to brush away the dust of our illusions. Seek, O Beginner, to blend thy Mind and Soul.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

The worth and power of the human mind are universally recognized. Events of to-day are compelling thinkers and educators to redefine the nature and function of mind. Beneath the economic revolution which is now taking place there is occurring a mental and a moral revolution. Only a few years ago, when the teaching of the esoteric philosophy was quoted that "mind is the great slayer of the real" the mystic-occultist was laughed at. Education and culture then meant, and to a great extent still mean, that of the mind alone. Idealists were unable to make any headway

in giving shape to their own aspirations.

"The Mind is the great slayer of the real, let the disciple slay the slayer." This instruction can be understood in a variety of ways. What about its application to educational reform ? Books and periodicals, sermons and lectures aim to inform and entertain the human mind. Purifying it, freeing it from both delusion and illusion, elevating it through a process of simplification, unfolding it through meditation—these have not been seriously studied. There has been much talk about heart and love and brotherliness,

but how many recognize that mental training has overpowered, almost to a crushing point, heart-expression ?

The heart is universally identified with emotion and sentiment and its superior function is not understood. Which system of education recognizes the possibility of the heart as an active organ of perception ? Modern psychology confirms the dictum that love is blind, whereas Asiatic psychology asserts that love brings clear-sight. Heart is the vehicle of intuition as mind is that of reason. The psychological action of the heart is regarded as a metaphor and no more. Mystics who have experienced the quickening of their own consciousness by intuition have but rarely known how it happened ; they describe the result of their experience rather than how it ensued. What about the praiseworthy work of the Boy Scouts and Path Finders and such movements ? Do not such efforts evolve the intuitive faculty ? No. In absence of scientific knowledge they have been able only to generate good fellow-feeling, as in old days the Sunday-school generated belief in one dogma or another. The *rationale* of love and sacrifice is absent. How Intuition can be developed, how that love which sees can be un-

folded, is not taught, and people believe in charity as they once believed in the bearded man whose name was God. And believers in charity and good will fall from grace as before believers in an anthropomorphic god fell ; and charity is practised compartmentally and compromisingly as religion was practised. People serve Brotherhood to-day as they worshipped God yesterday—in blind belief. The efficacy of heart-action suffers through lack of knowledge of the psychological heart, and all we know about is its physiological functions.

In the *Bhagavad-Gita*, in the *Yoga-Sutras* of Patanjali, in the *Mahayana Voice of the Silence* and in other old treatises, definite instruction is offered, for the development of Intuition, the Love that sees, the course of which doth ever run smooth. To understand such instruction even theoretically a key is required. The leaders and educators of to-day must become learners ; for such, among others, does this journal exist ; by provoking thought it tries to bring about enquiry so that seekers may go to the Source which is the Wisdom-Religion, practised by the greatest minds in every age and clime.

Unveil, O Thou who givest sustenance to the world, that face of the true Sun, which is now hidden by a vase of golden light ! so that we may see the truth and know our whole duty.

—ISHOPANISHAD, 15th

GREATER INDIA

[**Kalidas Nag** is the soul of the Greater India Society and editor of its monthly—*India and the World*. In a variety of ways he has served the cause of ancient culture and his knowledge and ability to present it has been recognized by Universities in three continents. He is the director of India Bureau, Calcutta, through which also he labours for the cause of International Cultural Federation.

His article forcefully brings to mind the views of H. P. Blavatsky about Greater India. In 1877 in her *Isis Unveiled* she wrote that "India was the *Alma-Mater*, not only of the civilization, arts, and sciences, but also of all the great religions of antiquity". (II. 30) "Egypt herself . . . had, received her laws, her social institutions, her arts and her sciences, from pre-Vedic India; and that therefore, it is in that old initiatrix of the priests—adepts of all the other countries—we must seek for the key to the great mysteries of humanity. And when we say, indiscriminately, 'India,' we do not mean the India of our modern days, but that of the archaic period. . . . There was an Upper, a Lower, and a Western India". (I. p. 589.).—EDS.]

India is just a country like any other country in this vast continent of Eur-Asia. Although acknowledged by philologists and ethnologists as the repository of the oldest specimens of Indo-European culture and the homeland of some of the earliest families of Mankind, India, as compared with ancient Greece and Rome, has received as yet scant and patronising attention from the universities and other high-brow institutions of the Occident, the dispensers of credentials of our age. India cannot boast of sending out regularly to important countries, her consuls of commerce and her ambassadors, political or cultural, who would cultivate systematically the foreign relations of India to her best advantage. She has not yet succeeded even in organising a news service worth her name and interest, to feed the various non-official, friendly institutions of the world. And although by some strange

post-war miracle, India was taken into the august League of Nations even as an original signatory and an independent member, she is not treated as an independent nation and is forced to keep a discreet silence or play the second fiddle in that giant international orchestra.

In spite of these serious drawbacks, however, we find India slowly but surely gaining the attention and sympathy of innumerable men and women all the world over. So much so, that expert publicists and professional ambassadors no less than chance tourists, roused by vicarious charity, have volunteered generously to warn the public (specially the American public) against the uncritical and premature enthusiasm for "Mother India". Nevertheless, the world opinion seems gradually and definitely in favour of learning more and more of India. This spontaneous interest of the outside world for India, coupled with the no less strange

and irresistible urge of India to embrace "the whole world as its kith and kin" (*Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam*) has brought into existence GREATER INDIA: or world-fellowship of India through the ages.

Far from developing, like so many other nations, within the narrow bounds of particularism in politics or economics, India appears already in the earliest pages of recorded history (not written books but archæological documents) as one of the few pioneers of ancient internationalism. The epoch-making discovery of the Indus Valley civilization by the great Indian Archæologist the late Mr. R. D. Bannerji has dealt the death-blow to the scholastic fabrication of the "Splendid Isolation" theory, and proved beyond doubt that India was in intimate contact with the whole ancient world through the Sumerians and other peoples of Mesopotamia, as early as the 4th millennium B. C. The three monumental volumes, recently published by Sir John Marshall, *Mohenjo-daro and the Indus Civilization* have demonstrated beyond doubt that the name "India" and the culture "Indian," are historically valid and are carrying the weight of at least six thousand years of continuous tradition and evolution. In town-planning, in elaborate use of writing on inscribed seals and in arts and crafts, the Indians of those dim antiquities appear already wonderfully advanced and "modern". Mr. E. Mackay, a colleague of Sir John Marshall,

while acting as the Director of the Joint Oxford and Field Museum, Chicago Expedition at *Kish* discovered there, a seal whose Indian cognates discovered later on, in Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro, proved beyond doubt that that date of the Indus civilization must be pre-Gargonic (*i. e.* prior to *circa* 2,750 B.C.) So Mr. C. Woolley found two other seals of Indian origin at *Ur*, one of which carries, besides the name of the owner—probably an Indian merchant—in Indus valley script, its *cuneiform* counterpart which might be dated *circa* 3,000 B. C. Moreover minor objects, other than seals, learning traces of Babylonian or Indian influence, are being identified in the finds from the whole ancient world, stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Nile valley (Egypt). These material links apart, we find wonderful connections through the exchange of symbols and decorative *motifs*, cults and iconographic specimens, the worship of the Mother Goddess, and of the symbols of fecundity, of animal icons and possibly of *Siva* 'the lord of animals,' and last, though not the least, the prevalence of some form of primitive *yoga* practices.

The above furnishes a strangely cosmopolitan background for the drama of the *Aryan penetration* of India (*circa* 2000 B.C.). The Aryan Path was not certainly one along a *tabula rasa* but was marked at every step by the healthy gesture of 'give and take,' of creative compromise and

assimilation. This lends a special interest now to every fragment of the recently discovered "Pre-Aryan and Pre-Dravidian" (court-esses to my esteemed Professor, M. Sylvain Lévi) civilization, as also to the earliest documents of ancient India—the *Vedic* literature of the *Aryans*. Along with their cousins, the *Iranians* the Aryans of India represented the earliest and most audacious branch of the Indo-European family. Amidst the bewildering and often contradictory theorisings of the archæologist of the *Rigvedic* and *Avesta* texts, we find the welcome fact recorded in the *Boghaz Keui* inscription, that Indo-Iranian deities like *Mitra*, *Varuna*, *Indra*, *Nasatya* etc. were worshipped in far off Cappadoneia as late as the 14th century B.C., while innumerable hymns in their honour (*Rik* or *Gatha*) have already been composed and carefully compiled in India and Iran. The history of Indo-Iranian collaboration has yet to be written but it is striking that towards the end of the second millennium B.C. there arose, almost simultaneously in India and Iran two great reformers: *Yajnyavalkya* and *Zarathustra*, both starting a revolt against religious materialism, and arid ritualism, mostly legacies of a primitive past and faith in magic. Both asserted the noble principle of moral responsibility inherent in the doctrines of *Atman* (Soul-Self) in the Upanishads and *Rita* (Truth) of the cult of Ahura-Mazda. The work of these

precursors was pushed farther by two other great Reformers Mahavira-Jina, founder of Jainism and Gautama Buddha, that of Buddhism (6th century, B.C.).

Towards the end of the sixth century B.C. our Iranian cousins under their great ruler Darius Acheminide, occupied that portion of the Indus valley which was the seat of the Mohenjo-Daro civilization. Sind was considered as one of the richest Satrapies of Darius who having masked the whole of Ionia, imparted the word *Yavana* indirectly to Sanskrit vocabulary and thus acted as the connecting link between the Hellenic and the *Hindu* world, long before Alexander swooped down the Hindu-kush to harass temporarily the Land of the five rivers—the Punjab. Some may doubt the influence of Iranian fire-cult on the early Greek speculations about Fire as the principle element in Creation, or may dispute the influence of the Hindu doctrine of Transmigration on Pythagoras; but none can disbelieve the transportation of Indian troops to far off Hellas fighting in the Persian ranks, against the Greek in the battle of Platara. From the age of Herodotus (5th century B.C.) to that of Ptolemy (2nd century A.D.), for over seven centuries India had been in vigorous contact with the Hellenic world. In Alexander, the decaying Hellas presented the last picture of Primitive imperialism and a century later, India introduced in Asoka the Great the first ruler of men who made *Kalyana*, Universal Well-

being, the basis of his Spiritual empire. By placing the best resources of his state, nay his own beloved son and daughter, at the service of the first great organization of Human Brotherhood, Asoka probably lost Maurya Empire but he gained the whole world on behalf of India and her deathless principles of *Ahimsa* (Non-Violence) and *Maitri* (fraternity) promulgated about three centuries ago by Mahavira and the Buddha. Realising the futility of war and physical conquest and the vanity of national megalomania, Asoka launched for himself and India, a new scheme of human relations based on *Good Will* and *Peace*. Hence his spiritual mission to Ceylon and Burma, to far off Syria, Egypt and Macedon. Hence also his initiation of treatment centres of dumb animals (*paśu-çikitsā*) the first of their kind in history. Within a century, the enemy, Greeks of *Gandhara* were participating eagerly in the worship of the *Avalokiteswara* of supreme compassion, developing the Græco-Buddhist Art. The Heliodorus inscription of Besnagar (150 B.C.) proves that some Greeks were taking also to the *Bhakti* cult of *Vaishnavism* which came to penetrate the world of primitive Christianity as Prof. Garbe and others have shown.

Thus bringing the noble doctrine of non-violence and fraternity, promulgated by Mahavira and the Buddha, in the plane of practical politics and by emphasising on the two great principles of toler-

ance and well-being, Asoka inaugurated a new chapter in the history of the world and sounded the key-note of Indian history, as the real pioneer of GREATER INDIA, and race after race, nation after nation, coming in contact with India benefited by participating in that cultural federation. China, Central Asia, Korea, Japan, Tibet, the trans-Gangetic peninsula gradually were welcomed in that spiritual confederacy which far outshone the glamour of the ephemeral confederacy of Delos or of Magna Græcia. Not mere dry doctrines and dead rituals but living sparks of creative spirituality: architecture, sculpture and painting, statecraft and law, myths and legends, dances and dramas, sciences and philosophies forming the great epics of this glorious millennium and a half, came to make the whole of the Orient as it were, a stage for a colossal Cosmodrama with India in the central rôle. Iranians and Greeks, Parthians and Scythians, Chinese and Hunas, Arabs and Afghans, Hindus and Buddhists, Christians and Moslems—What a gigantic procession from the initiation of Emperor Asoka to the reign of the last Mongol Buddhist Emperor Kubelai Khan (13th century A.D.). So many brilliant foreign observers also: Megasthenes and Chang Kien, Fa-hien and Hiuen-Tsang, Alberuni and Marco Polo leaving us invaluable pages of their "Travel Diaries," testifying to the phenomenal development of internationalism through commerce, colo-

nization and cultural fellowship.

Years of patient research and intensive collaboration between scholars of India and of abroad, could bring about a satisfactory reconstruction of this remarkable history, and here we Indians must gratefully acknowledge the selfless services rendered by some of the greatest lovers of Truth and Beauty from the Occident. Towards the middle of the 18th century while England and France were still fighting for the possession of the material body of India, her spiritual legacies treasured up in her scriptures, were the object of the quest of an intrepid Frenchman Auquitil du Perron, who attempted to bring to his country sacred literature of the *Hindus* and of the *Parsis*. There was a great controversy over the *Vedas*, roused by the exposition of the Jesuit forgery of the so-called "*Yazour-Veda*," by Voltaire; and du Perron had the satisfaction of bringing to Europe, if not original *Vedas*, at least the great manuals of the post-Vedic philosophy—the *Upanishads* as they were adopted by the Persian scholars of the court of Dara Shiko. He also brought for the first time the authentic texts of the *Zend-Avesta*. Then came the great English scholar Sir William Jones, prodigy of a linguist, equally at home with the ancient texts of the East and the West, of Persia and India. His translation of *Sakuntala* of Kalidasa which gained the enthusiastic applause of the Great Goethe, marks an epoch in the intellectual co-operation between

India and Europe. It was followed by important translations of the *Bhagavad-Gita* (The Song Celestial), of the Code of *Manu*, and such other Classics while round about Jones, a galaxy of Orientalists like Wilkins, Colebrooke and others formed the first Indian Academy of research and publication—the Asiatic Society of Bengal founded towards the end of the governorship of Warren Hastings (1783). The credit of founding the first society of Oriental Research goes however to the Dutch who formed the Batavian Institute of Arts and Sciences as early as 1744. Neither the East India Company nor the British Parliament thought it necessary to provide for the education of the Indians on Western lines. Yet individual Britisher, missionaries, and laymen helped the cause of education and research leading to the discovery of the Ajanta frescoes and the Annals of Rajasthana (Todd) as early as the first quarter of the nineteenth century and to the deciphering of the Aso-kan inscriptions by James Prinsep just a century ago (1830-32).

But long before that the Spirit of India asserted again after years, through the personality of Ram Mohan Roy (1772-1833), the Father of Modern India and the Pioneer of a Grand Reformation *from within*. Seeing the light of day in the age of French Illumination, a contemporary of Colebrooke and Wilson, he has the rare gift of feeling intensely the suffering and the degradation of his people as a whole especially

of the women and of the common people—in that age of political and social disintegration. His whole life was dedicated to the cause of liberty and equality with reference to the different sections of the Indian people, whom he hoped to find unified some day before the sacred altar of Unity the corner-stone of the philosophy of the Upanishads and the Vedanta, which he rediscovered for the whole nation and published in so many editions during the early part of the nineteenth century. With that unshakable faith in the fundamental unity of mankind, Ram Mohan Roy combined a tolerance and an all-embracing sympathy which mark him as a continuator of the best traditions of the Greater India of yore and the fore-runner of the heroes of the Greater India of to-day. Even during the Moham-medan occupation through the awful clash between Hinduism and Islam, our great medieval saints Kabir and Nanak, Dadu and Chaitanya developed in theory and practice, the age-old principle of Reconciliation. Ram Mohan also struggled all his life for reconciling the universal elements of Hinduism, Islam and Christianity. His spiritual descendants like Maharshi Debendranath Tagore and Keshab Chunder Sen, Daya-

nanda and Ramkrishna, Vivekananda and Ranade, Rabindranath Tagore and Mahatma Gandhi—to mention only a few among the galaxy of great souls—worked and continue to work to-day for the building of GREATER INDIA for the future. And in this work they are, as is natural, supported throughout by the chosen spirits of the Occident: Burnouf and Maxmüller, Edwin Arnold and Madame Blavatsky, C. F. Andrews and Romain Roland, Sister Nivedita, Annie Besant, and Sister Mira Ben (Madeline Slade) among others to whom the whole 'Indian Nation' would ever be grateful. The history of this new and momentous *rapprochement* of the East and the West is too rich and important to be summarily treated here. So, in conclusion, I simply emphasise the fact that there is a remarkable continuity so far as India is concerned, in the attitude of India towards her partners in the World Federation and that, in spite of temporary disturbances and deflections in the current of her material existence India of Tagore and Gandhi through the affirmation of the great spiritual principle (old yet new) of Non-Violence and World Fellowship has taken her own place in the future evolution of humanity.

KALIDAS NAIDU

THE MYSTICISM OF A. E.

[**Humbert Wolfe** like the hero of his article is poet as well as a practical man of affairs ; this essay also indicates that the mystic in him is not altogether voiceless ; but we cannot say, for we do not know, that like A. E. he derives his inspiration directly from Theosophy. Old time theosophists can never forget the fiery and uplifting writings of A. E. in the old theosophical journals.—EDS.]

There are two kinds of mysticism—one is the substitution of vague emotion for the rules of thought, the second is to follow thought to its limit and then to look beyond by some faculty, not akin to thought, rather using thought as a ladder, kicked away when the wings grow. Of the first kind of mystic and mysticism all metaphysicians are justly contemptuous. For in the very act of denying thought its despiser uses it. The second kind the philosopher may wish to confute, though he can never dismiss him. No man, not even a Kant or a Spinoza can affirm beyond his own question that there is not a region inaccessible to the mind, as there are regions inaccessible to the ear and eye. He can at best say "non cogito, ergo non est," but in his secret heart he will still have to admit that "cogito" is in the first person singular. He dare not, unless he is arrogant as Lucifer, claim dominion for his single mind. He can at best say that direct apprehension of the inscrutable is denied to him and is not consistent with any logic that he can construe. He will not, if he is a good metaphysician, sneer at this type of mystic. He will remember that no less a thinker than Plato

had so definite a mystical tinge that he engendered a whole school of mysticism. He is bound to take the doctrine into serious account, and, even as he disclaims it, he may well turn away with a faint sigh of envy for those who are—or believe themselves to be—illuminati.

A. E. belongs to the second order of mystics, those who proceed by reason to faith, and who, as they believe, by some quality possible to all contemplative men, can see the object of prayer by the act of praying. A.E., indeed, is the last of men to be liable to the accusation of an easy surrender to muzziness. His life on one side at least has been practical in the extreme. For years he was a conscientious and notably successful administrator. His work in the Co-operative Agricultural movement has left a permanent mark in Ireland. Nor was it only in this direction that he harnessed the tides of dream, and used them as a new and formidable source of power. In all the Celtic Renaissance he played the part of an innocent but no less creative Cosimo de Medici. In the foundation of the Abbey Theatre, as in the re-organisation of the Gaelic tongue he played a leading and orderly part. As the

editor of *The Irish Statesman* he helped not only to direct literature along its re-appointed path, but he strove mightily in the councils of Irish politicians. A.E. can therefore not be set on one side as a hopeless visionary, who took refuge from his failure in life in daydreams. On the contrary he has shown himself to be one of those rare and dangerous figures who can precipitate their dream in action. If he is not (and no mortal ever can be) the dreamer whose dream came true, he is most certainly a dreamer whose dream neither was nor became a lie.

In the preface to *The Candle of Vision*—the book in which he states his mystical faith—he writes: "When I meditate I feel in the images and thoughts which throng about me reflections of personality, but there are also windows in the soul through which can be seen images created not by human but by the divine imagination." In other words he claims a dual recording capacity for the spirit of man. If he were to use a metaphor from the wireless he would say that at different wave-lengths the same machine can tune in to different stations. There are other programmes than those dictated by Daventry in the waiting ether—if we are prepared to be patient and to listen both attentively and modestly. It may, of course, be objected that the *ex-hypothesi* inaccessible cannot be heard, and that to speak of listening on a wave-length to what is in its essence beyond both wave and

length is simply an instance of that contradiction in terms which is the hall-mark of mysticism. Moreover, the objector will continue, stations accessible to one auditor alone are the stations of unreason and madness; to which A. E. may retort that there is no object of sense that can in fact be shared. The truth about the mind of man is rather its icebound and impenetrable loneliness than its superficial and fleeting communities.

Your primrose may faintly in form, colour, touch and scent resemble mine, but while yours may still be a modest yellow blossom on the river's brim mine may be a memory of something lost, an explanation or a reward. Therefore to have a solitary vision of ancient majestic House of the King does not impugn its reality but merely asserts the good fortune of the lonely witness.

It is true that A. E. begins by assuming a spiritual foundation of thought and of the world

the Master of Angelic powers
lightens the dusk within
The Holy of Holies, be it thine to win
rare vistas of white light,
Half-parted lips through which the Infinite
Murmurs its ancient story.

That is no doubt to beg the central question as between materialism and idealism. But in the long run every philosopher, whether consciously or unconsciously, begs that question. If we take no less eminent and absolute a thinker than Kant we find that he makes a leap, justified by no process of reason, from the a priori unity of apperception to that which is the

sanction of that mortal unity. Descartes, by asserting "I think therefore I am" unreasonably accepted the ego and thought. All metaphysicians, even the mathematical-realists, are in the presence of an unresolved surd, and it becomes a matter of temperament or taste whether the final conclusion is *credo or non credo quia incredibile*.

We may, therefore, grant A.E. his Universal Spirit without too much difficulty, but we are entitled to ask that, if so much is granted, he shall be logically consistent in the climate that he has chosen for his mind to inhabit. And that logic he resolutely pursues. To him revelation which is barred by the grave is false or lagging revelation. "The religion," he says, which does not cry out, 'I am to-day verifiable as that water wets or that fire burns. Test me that ye may become as gods!' "Mistrust it," or as he says it in verse:

And the fire divine in all things burning
seeks the mystic heart anew,
From its wanderings far again returning
Child, to you.

Seriously and simply A.E. asserts and believes that it is possible by meditation to behold, as William Blake also beheld, images not projected by the mind but imposed upon it from without. He speaks of mankind being "like frogs at the bottom of a marsh knowing nothing of that Many-Coloured land, which is superior to this we know, yet related to it as soul to body". He believes that he himself has visited the outlying countries of the

Coloured Land and on occasion has even had a glimpse of the central and ineffable City. All that he has seen is of necessity beauty and splendour of mortal kind raised to a more than mortal height. He does not report the unthought in terms of the unthinkable, because to do that would be false in logic. The fact that images are impressed from without and beyond does not, and cannot, alter the receptive capacity of the mind. The instrument may record unexpected tidings but it can only record, however transcendent, in its own language. When he writes of central heaven "A golden air glowed in this place, and high between the pillars were thrones which faded, glow by glow, to the end of the vast hall. On them sat the Divine Kings. They were fire-crested" he is not suggesting that the elements of light have in themselves mortal shapes. He means only that for mortal revelation they must assume those shapes. The truth, as A.E. sees it, indeed is!

For this, for this the lights innumerable
As symbols shine that we the true light win:
For every deep and every star they fill
Are stars and deeps within.

We may admit, therefore, that if there is to be revelation at all it must have shape intelligible, even though the shapes be as strange or heraldic as those (as he claimed) vouchsafed to John of Patmos. But how are we to know, A.E. asks, that they are more than delusion, or at most a recapitulation of experience half-forgotten and re-clothed in fancy? Here A.E. uses what, as you may

prefer it, may be called either the *argumentum ad hominem* or the *argumentum ad angelum*. Those who deny the possibility of this over-sight he roundly denounces as persons who "see too feebly to make what they see a wonder to themselves". Basing himself in the slender (and by no means proved) facts of telepathy, he proceeds to argue that if mind can make impact on mind, how much more certainly can the over-mind impress itself on the infra-mind. But that is dangerous ground to take. If we assume that there is as much distance between God and the human mind as between that and a table, we are bound to ask what evidence we have that our mind can ever approach the dumb darkness of wood. It is much safer for A.E. to rely on his primal assumption, and to argue that, since none has measured or can measure the miracle of normal cognition, there is none who can with authority determine its boundaries. He might, and could, consider his own argument in his book *Song and Its Fountains*. He might justly say that to minds clarified by intense thought and stimulated by the blood of genius, nothing appears common and mean. To all things earthly, as Plato wrote, there corresponds an archetype laid up in heaven. This does not, and should not mean, that there are heavenly kettles and divine pots and pans. It means that we move through degrees of error to degrees of truth, and just as Einstein outstrips Copernicus, and

Copernicus the Ptolemaic system, so the poet's and the metaphysician's mind outstrips that of the mind clogged by vacancy and custom.

Far up the dim twilight fluttered
Moth-wings of vapour and flame :
The lights danced over the mountains
Star after star they came,
The lights grew thicker unheeded,
For silent and still were we ;
Our hearts were drunk with a beauty
Our eyes could never see.

Given this difference and ascendancy A. E. may say with truth and honour "Come with me and we will bathe in the Fountains of Youth. I can point you the way to El Dorado".

The apprehension of the released or concentrated mind is, or can be, logical and consistent, but it has also an ageless continuity. Here A. E. is on firm ground though he does not invoke the proofs of science. Certain it is that as matter is indestructible, so equally are indestructible the experiences endured by matter. Or if we choose to state this truism in the language of the seer we can say with A. E. "The beauty for which men perished is still shining: Helen is there in her Troy, and Deidre wears the beauty which blasted the Red Branch." Earth, in fact, preserves its memories of its children as it preserves the wisdom of its flowers and birds. The gull's stoop and flight were learned if not in Eden at least in inaccessible antiquity, and they will persist beyond our conjecture. By immemorial instruction the least *forget-me-not* expands its blue stars. So then in blood and bone will and must

continue the existence of those who, since the beginning of time, have been warmed with the one and built up on the other. It is of no specific pre-existence that it is spoken here, but of general pre-existence the known and provable fact of the immortal in humanity, of the unchangeable in what changes always.

But A. E. does not stay with earth-memory, though this is the substance or, rather the prose, of thought. He goes further to imagination and dream and he writes, "I am convinced that all poetry is as Emerson said, first written in the heavens". But this need mean no more, and in fact means no more, than that as we speak clearer the dust of earth falls further from us. We have advanced one rung up Jacob's ladder, but beyond that are all the untrodden rungs of the Spirit.

Nevertheless A. E. is troubled by his own dictum. He is conscious not that—

our sweetest songs are those
that tell of saddest thought,

but rather our truest songs are those that leave the most unsaid. And, believing that direct intuition is in essence wordless, he inclines, like William Blake and others, to the perilous bypath of the symbol. He seeks to find in language or in the sound constituting language some ultimate assignation with unspoken truth. Here we cannot easily follow him, because symbols have to every man their private meaning. On the other hand in the mysterious beauty of words there is

something inexplicable by ordinary means. Why is it, for example, that Shakespeare's

Put up your bright swords or the dew
shall rust them

has so sweet a power on the blood? How is it that some old phrase like "*ecce ancilla domini*" is a password to something wholly transcending its sound. Truly A. E. may urge that words are the dictionary of heaven, but we must all make our own vocabulary, and we are not necessarily aided by another's choice. What we learn from A. E. in the matter of words is but a part of his general teaching, and is that there is always the unexplored, the unknown, and that, if we faithfully attend, each of us can be admitted to a share of essential light

Everywhere

I saw the mystic vision glow
And live in men and woods and streams,
Until I could no longer know
The dream of life from my own dreams.
Sometimes it rose like fire in me
Within the depths of my own mind,
And speaking to infinity
It took the voices of the wind.

But at the last the mystic vision is but the intensity with which the soul returns upon itself, and so returning is re-admitted to its general heritage. A. E., being specially endowed, has a greater share of that legacy, but being one of God's spendthrifts, he greatly shares it with the world. We shall only be worthy of his bounty if we do not accept his vision at secondhand, but ourselves seek our own along the path that he has prepared for us.

HUMBERT WOLFE

THE INFINITE

[Dr. Tobias Dantzig is the Professor of Mathematics at the University of Maryland and author of *Number, The Language of Science*. In this article he examines as a mathematician the concept of Infinity; its interest for the Theosophical student will even be greater if he compares the views of Dr. Dantzig with the teachings of H. P. Blavatsky. In her *The Secret Doctrine* (I, 94) she wrote:

"It is from this number 10, or creative nature, the Mother (the occult cipher, or 'nought,' ever procreating and multiplying in union with the Unit '1', one, or the Spirit of Life), that the whole universe proceeded."

And again, (Vol. I, 66) "As Balzac, the unconscious Occultist of French literature, says somewhere, the Number is to Mind the same as it is to matter: "an incomprehensible agent;" (perhaps so to the profane, never to the Initiated mind). Number is, as the great writer thought, an Entity, and, at the same time, a Breath emanating from what he called God and what we call the ALL; the breath which alone could organize the physical Kosmos, "where naught obtains its form but through the Deity, which is an effect of Number." It is instructive to quote Balzac's words upon this subject:—

"The smallest as the most immense creations, are they not to be distinguished from each other by their quantities, their qualities, their dimensions, their forces and attributes, all begotten by the NUMBER? The infinitude of the Numbers is a fact proven to our mind, but of which no proof can be physically given. The mathematician will tell us that the infinitude of the numbers exists but is not to be demonstrated. God is a Number endowed with motion, which is felt but not demonstrated. *As Unity, it begins the Numbers, with which it has nothing in common* The existence of the Number depends on Unity, which, without a single Number, begets them all.""]

There is a story, entitled "The Abyss," from the pen of the great Russian writer, Leonid Andreyev. The gruesome *dénouement* fits well the morbid genius of its author, but it is the beginning of this story that concerns us here, and this, as if by contrast, is quite idyllic. The two lovers—mere adolescents—are out on a walk in the woods. Their talk turns on the infinite, and he asks her, how she conceives it. She replies that she sees wagons, one wagon after another, and still another behind that one, and, another and yet another . . .

Many and sundry have been the definitions and the formula-

tions which philosophers, mathematicians and near-mathematicians have given to this mysterious concept; yet, in the ultimate analysis, they add nothing to this naïve utterance, *another and yet another*. Any number, no matter how great, has a successor; the process of adding one to a number cannot be conceivably terminated—these and a dozen other statements may be quoted as attempts to introduce into mathematics the infinite, without using the term explicitly.

Be it an axiom, a disguised definition, the expression of man's impotence to exhaust Nature by number, or of his innate conviction

tion that what has been said or done once can ever be repeated,—the infinite permeates the whole elaborate edifice of mathematics. From this conception mathematics derives its power, its marvellous generality, its dominant position among other sciences; to this conception mathematics owes its greatest triumphs; and also, alas! its greatest perplexities. For the infinite has been the box of Pandora from which have sprung the many paradoxes, antinomies and logical difficulties that have vexed mathematicians since the days of the Greek Sophists.

“What is true for *one*, is true for *all*, provided that if true for *any* number, it is true for the *next*.” In this form the conception of infinity is known as the principle of mathematical or *complete induction*. The qualification “complete” is indispensable. Indeed, there is another principle of induction which plays as fundamental a rôle in the experimental sciences as its namesake does in mathematics. This latter is known as incomplete induction, or induction by *inference*. In its essence, it consists in the assertion that the future will resemble the past. In more precise terms, if in the observation of any phenomenon a certain tendency towards permanence has been exhibited, then it may with reasonable safety be inferred that the same tendency will manifest itself in the future, the certainty of this inference being the greater, the more frequently the tendency has been observed

in the past. I said that this principle is basic for the experimental sciences, but this is hardly putting it strongly enough, for inasmuch as inductive inference is our only rational clue to the future, it is the basis of all our planning and activity, nay, of all human experience.

The connection between the two principles of induction is not merely in name; in a certain sense, they complement each other. Mathematical induction, by sanctifying indefinite iteration, affirms the power of the human mind to conceive the endless repetition of any act that is at all possible; inductive inference, on the other hand, reassures us that this power is not an idle fancy on the part of man, or vain mania of grandeur, since Nature—of which, after all, man is but a part—is itself bent on such an indefinite repetition of similar events.

Both principles are intimately related to the number concept. Mathematical induction lends to number, and through number to all mathematics, that exceptionless generality which no other domain of human knowledge possesses. Induction by inference invests number with the dignity of supreme arbiter of judgment by maintaining that an event that has occurred a number of times cannot be classed as a sheer accident; that this recurrence points to a universal law, to a certainty; that this certainty could be established in full rigor experimentally were we not by our physical

and physiological limitations prevented from observing the phenomenon an infinite number of times. As a corollary to this argument we have the principle of *causality*.

I do not propose to undertake here a discussion of causality, nor to delve into the advanced principles of mathematical analysis with its intricate problems of aggregates, continua, and transfinite numbers. I take it that we all know what is meant by inference and how important is the rôle it plays in human judgment. The importance of mathematical induction is not, perhaps, so well realized; and so I would like to suggest that the next time you have occasion to add up your grocery bill, you should try to give yourself account as to the logical grounds of the operations which you so glibly perform. Indeed, strange as this may appear to you at first, the proof of the logical validity of even the most simple arithmetical operations already implies the infinite, inasmuch as the demonstration is based on complete induction.

Thus, we encounter the infinite on the very threshold of mathematics. As we progress further, we meet on every step more and more intensive applications of this concept, until we reach infinitesimal analysis, where the infinite process reigns undisputed. Here we begin to realize that there are infinities and infinities, that the natural sequence, for instance, which starts innocently enough with 1, 2, 3, while infinite, is not

infinite in the same way as the totality of points on a line. One advances still further, and finally reaches the dizzy heights of the theory of transfinite numbers, where this distinction between various infinities has been taken as the point of departure for a new theory of numbers.

To be sure, as we compass the field of modern mathematics, the logical difficulties grow; and yet they increase in degree rather than in essence. Like counting itself, of which all the infinite processes used in mathematics are but extensions, they stand or fall according as we concede or refute the statement that what has been done or said once can ever be repeated. In the ultimate analysis, all of mathematics rests on the conception of infinity.

It is of the validity of this conception that I wish to speak here. Not, however, in terms of logic: it is not within my power to add or detract from the ancient dispute that began in the days of Plato—if not before—and will no doubt end when the last mathematical philosopher will have joined his predecessors. It is in the light of human values that I wish to discuss this concept: what place must it be assigned among the many other principles which have guided man on his long journey from primitive thought to the present-day integrated outlook on the universe?

With this in view, I shall begin by recalling that man has not confined his speculations on the infinite, or on causation, for that mat-

ter, to the realm of science. Long before the days when science had an independent existence, in those remote ages when it was still but an insignificant appendix to religious cults, and when mathematics was confined to crude surveying and occult numerology,—the priest-philosophers of the Orient had meditated on the infinite. These meditations have left their indelible imprint on all our modern religions: the infinite as an attribute of the Deity is a feature common to all creeds, however they may differ otherwise. Closely related to such other ideas as omnipotence, omniscience, immortality, boundless vastness and eternity, the infinite permeates all monotheistic doctrines, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. And not only monotheistic, for the Græco-Roman and other pagan mythologies exhibit the same ideas.

Is this resemblance between scientific and religious speculations on the infinite purely formal? Is it nothing more than the case of one and the same term used in two different and entirely unrelated senses? Or is it the portent of the common source from which religion and science have issued? I have dealt with these and analogous questions in a volume which is soon to appear under the title "Faith and Fate". This is no place to defend my thesis; so I shall merely offer the conclusions I have reached there for what they are worth.

That the infinite is an axiom, all will grant. Yet there are axioms

and axioms: some are but canons of logic, others are vouchsafed by experience. The conception of infinity belongs to neither category. That it is not a consequence of formal logic is attested by the many logical paradoxes that it has engendered, while the essentially finite character of all human experience precludes the possibility of its deriving from this source.

There is still a third category of principles which have played a most fundamental part in the evolution of scientific thought. They bear a striking resemblance to religious credos and may, for this reason, be called *articles of faith*. To this category belongs our conviction in the absolute character of space and time, in the causal connection between events, in the rational pattern of the universe, and many other *irrefutable* notions and principles. Indeed, the more irrefutable a principle may appear to us, the better right we have to suspect it of belonging to this category of articles of faith.

Here, in my opinion, belongs the conception of infinity too. From the possibility of an act in a finite number of cases we infer its possibility in an indefinite and unlimited number of cases. That a physical or physiological execution of such an interminable series of operations is impossible, is readily recognized by us; but we cannot or will not subject to the same limitations the power of our mind. Indeed, when our mind contemplates the

future, it must needs flee its mortal shell, to find refuge within an infinite being of *limitless memory and eternal life*. To this Divine Being the infinite past had once been an infinite future; his inferences from the past to the future derive their validity from infinite experience; the infinite to him is not an article of faith, but a phase of reality, for he knows no fear of oblivion.

Why does man endow his mind with these divine attributes? What is the source of this irresistible will to permanence from which derive these articles of faith? What causes man to seek order and reason in this shifting chaos of his sensations, and, by projecting himself into the future, perpetuate his life, as it were? He who knows the answer to these questions holds the key to the problem of reality.

I make no such pretensions. But whatever its source, it is this will to permanence that inspires our faith that the future will be like the past; that even as the present derives from the past, so

is the future foreshadowed by the present; that the universe is governed by immutable laws; that our recurring impressions can wrest from Nature the secret of these laws; that by willed acts we can foster these impressions and accelerate our knowledge of this universe; that no bound can be set to the reproduction of these willed acts, for what has been done or said once can ever be repeated.

To this will to permanence I trace the two fundamental principles on which, in turn, rest all our sciences, pure and applied. It is this will that, by sanctifying indefinite iteration, has created the exotic scheme of utmost generality and abstraction which we call mathematics; from it too derives its validity induction by inference, this corner stone of empirical knowledge. If we reflect, that the same will to permanence has ever been the source of all religious inspiration, we can but exclaim:

"It is a strange world, this only world we know!"

TOBIAS DANTZIG

THOUGHTS ON KINDNESS

[**Hugh de Selincourt** is a well-known novelist and dramatist, a lover of children, and a man of peace. Of him an intimate of his household is reported to have said: "We shouldn't want any League of Nations, if other people were like the Boss and our Missis." We extend a welcome to him among our contributors.—EDS.]

"Now tell me, dear, what is it you do want?" said the elder sister in the play to her thoroughly discontented younger sister and the girl burst out: "Oh! what we all want! A little kindness!"

I have forgotten everything else in Henry James's brilliant comedy except those lines and those lines I shall never forget. They continually come back to my mind. Kindness seems such a little thing; and yet it is so rare. We seem terrified of "mistaken kindness," as though no kindness at all were not far more harmful.

Indeed, any contact with another human being where kindness is left out leads to absurdity: the closer and more important the contact the greater and more tragic does the absurdity become. Kindness alone can let down the little bridge of imagination between one man and another, without which no communication is possible. Without kindness we meet our fellows as earthenware pots on a stream meet, at best to crack and splinter, at worst to break and sink.

Men are prone to sit back and look at others like problems to be coldly solved: especially are the young apt to be treated in this way on what is known as their entry into life, like the girl in the

play. "Life is so important, dear. What are you going to do in life?" is the tenor of the perpetual cry. It is bad to be pushed in any direction: it is most horribly worst of all to be pushed in the direction you want to take. Such earnest pressure acts like a push before a jump—disastrously: making you stand more obstinately still in resistance or if you take off for the jump stumble.

Kindness in reality supplies the means of communication in the spiritual world as money does in the material world. They are strangely equivalent. That is why a very rich man so often seems isolated and remote from all humanity. Instances flock to my mind. Fear and suspicion sap initiative: only negative action, the preventive measure, can ever be taken, by man or nation, chiefly anxious to hold on to possessions. Goodwill and understanding alone are the springs of creative action.

An example forces itself upon my attention. It affords a perfect illustration in little of the Economic Crisis which affects the nations of the world to-day: and this Economic Crisis will never be solved by august assemblies in counsel but by a change of heart in individual men and women, of whom the nations of

the world are composed. It contains the same problem of want in the midst of abundance and shows to what tragic idiocy reason may lead when dissociated from kindness so that it comes to pass inevitably (so completely can cold reason unaided reverse the wheel of honest sense) that unkindness amounting to cruelty is held up, decked in the garb of justice and right living, to represent the greatest kindness.

My example involves a very rich father and one of his sons with talent as an artist. Now, the basis of the father's creed is the very sound idea (echoed of course with violence in the heart of every young man, passionately anxious to be independent and on his own feet) that a man must be self-supporting, must earn his own living. He gave his son every chance—prep. school, public school and so on—in which he can prove his ability: not consulting him as to these various steps—what child knows what's good for him? In each one, the son shows himself a failure. A position is found for him in business, and his associates, knowing him to be a very rich man's son, urge him to take his duties with becoming lightness. The very genuineness of his desire to become an artist makes him bashful of taking himself seriously in what to him is the highest calling a human being can tackle,—himself, the failure in far less important matters. Things, however, at length, become crucial. He breaks away and studies painting. "Prove

you are not a waster" runs the parental edict, "And I will help you." In other words: "Earn money, and I'll give you some more." It goes from absurdity to *tragic* absurdity. "You have no affection for me; you only want my money"—And the father lives alone in vast houses—his son elsewhere, as he has no dress suit and might borrow money from the servants if allowed to be alone in the country house. A complete impasse is reached. They glare at each other over a pile of gold: the son, an insoluble problem.

And with a little kindness? No problem. Son's need would be father's chance; who might even see his own responsibility towards his son: might even say these three hardest words in the language to articulate to another, when their meaning is felt, "I am sorry". Sorry, of course, not to have discovered his son's bent sooner, and not to have encouraged him in it: sorry to have continually urged him in the wrong direction. His personal dignity might suffer in owning himself wrong: nothing else would. Ah! that stuck up mountebank of personal dignity. It is the chief enemy of kindness—the strutting self, shutting us into an ever narrower box of distorted loneliness.

Few of us have got beyond the stage, perfectly described in 'Tom: the History of a very Little Boy'. Poor Tom was coming to tea with Rich Tom, whose mother pointed out to him that whereas he had several horses, poor Tom had none. The suggestion was

obvious and Tom found it very awkward, and when poor Tom came, very silent-making. But at length he said most seriously: "I'd like to give you one of my horses but I can't, you see, because it's mine!"

It is the lack of kindness (without which understanding is impossible) that seduces men to ape the evil of military organization and band themselves together in a mass to achieve a purpose which they consider good for the community. Nazis are born on the one side; Communists on the other, each banded together for freedom and the rights of man—which is never possible for either until the other is overcome or destroyed. The enemies of life are greed and selfishness, and the stuffiness of habit generated by the stiffness of age. They are most easily observed in others: but they can never be destroyed in others. They are less easily observed,

where alone they can be effectually overcome, *in ourselves*.

Kindness which is the simplest form of creative good can never be organised; and can never be generalised. It begins with those nearest to us, and as it grows develops a power of understanding whose influence may spread, quietly as light, who knows how far?

Moreover, every baby born, rightly viewed, is Nature's perfect revolutionary—challenging by its pressure of new life the old order, cleaning us from the accretions of habit that stiffen and dull the perceptions—the baby allowed to grow!

There now and always lies both the rejuvenation of the present and the hope of the future: there and only there. Nature's simple process, which we need all our human intelligence to fathom and incorporate in our lives.

HUGH DE SELINCOURT

Never will I seek nor receive private, individual salvation; never will I enter into final peace alone; but forever, and everywhere, will I live and strive for the redemption of every creature throughout the world.

—THE PLEDGE OF KWAN-YIN

EVOLUTION

[J. D. Beresford recommends that thinking people should impartially view the drama of human evolution presented in the ancient Wisdom-Religion, and compare it with the Darwinian theory. The following extracts from H. P. Blavatsky's monumental work will enable the reader better to appreciate the position taken by thinkers like Mr. Beresford in the following article.]

“Divergence among men of Science, their mutual, and often their *self*-contradictions, that gave the writer of the present volumes the courage to bring to light other and older teachings—if only as hypotheses for *future* scientific appreciation. Though not in any way very learned in modern sciences, so evident, even to the humble recorder of this archaic clearing, are the said scientific fallacies and gaps, that she determined to touch upon all these, in order to place the two teachings on parallel lines. For Occultism, it is a question of self-defence, and nothing more.”—*The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. II, p. 649

“The present writer, claiming no great scientific education, but only a tolerable acquaintance with modern theories, and a better one with Occult Sciences, picks up weapons against the detractors of the esoteric teaching in the very arsenal of modern Science. The glaring contradictions, the mutually-destructive hypotheses of world-renowned Scientists, their mutual accusations, denunciations and disputes, show plainly that, whether accepted or not, the Occult theories have as much right to a hearing as any of the so-called learned and academic hypotheses.”—*The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. 487

“Rough and up-hill is the path of true Science, and its days are full of vexation of Spirit. But in the face of its ‘thousand contradictory hypotheses to explain physical phenomena. . . . Science will be as far from the solution of its difficulties as it is now, unless it comes to some compromise with Occultism and even with Alchemy—which supposition will be regarded as an impertinence, but remains a fact, nevertheless.”—*The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. 496.—EDS.]

The most interesting phase in the development of non-religious thought during the past sixty years is that illustrated by a consideration of the scientific and general opinion with regard to the subject of evolution. Its origins must be sought more than half a century earlier, in the first years

of the nineteenth century, when Lamarck, the French naturalist, originated the idea that animal species were not static, but that in certain cases at least, one might have been derived from another by the inheritance of acquired characteristics. This theory, however, though of in-

interest to the naturalists, made little appeal to the attention of the general public, and it remained for Charles Darwin to bring the subject into the newspaper and the pulpit. His first essay on the *Origin of Species*, (1859) was sufficient to do that, but it was not until after the publication of *The Descent of Man* in 1871, that the Christian conception of "special creation" was seriously challenged and a spirit of doubt as to its probability began to filter down very, very slowly through the diverse strata of the public intelligence.

Darwin's influence at that period was derived from the fact that he came forward with what looked like a reasonable and convincing explanation of certain biological phenomena. He had postulated a mechanism, that of what is still known as "natural selection," and the Western mind of that period was in a condition peculiarly ready to believe in it. On broad lines, the theory was astonishingly plausible and if there still remained one or two highly important gaps to be filled, there was a feeling abroad that further research would inevitably close them. It is true that some of the best intelligences of the time were not truly converted. Thomas Huxley although he publicly upheld Darwin's main thesis maintained a reservation, on scientific grounds, as to its full applicability. And Samuel Butler, whose writing it must be confessed had little or no influence on his own generation, steadily main-

tained his opposition to the theory as a whole. But by the closing years of the nineteenth century scientific thought, which was then at the height of its influence on the public mind generally conceded the Darwinian position, and the biologists although divided into two schools on the contentious question of "acquired characteristics," had come to assume the original postulate as an axiom.

Now where this exceedingly brief sketch of the early years of the Darwinian controversy is of interest to readers of THE ARYAN PATH, is in its illumination of one of the phases through which the Western mind has been passing in the last half-century. Personally, I believe that materialism as a recognisable influence on human philosophy reached its climax with the end of the last century. And I would even advance in support of that statement the fact that it is always in such periods of greatest degradation that the new prophet and herald comes to preach the doctrine that, neglected or openly scorned by his, or her, contemporaries in the mass, survives to become the testament of later generations.

Certainly no one in what we know as the scientific world paid any heed to the full explanation of all the outstanding criticisms of the Darwinian theory, as expounded by Madame Blavatsky in *The Secret Doctrine*, published seventeen years after *The Descent of Man*. Human intelligence in the mass is turgidly conservative, and neither the churches on the one

hand nor the materialists on the other, were in a condition to be stirred either by the evocation of the ancient wisdom or what, in this connection of evolution, amounted to nothing more nor less than rational common-sense. But, as has been indicated, the years immediately preceding and following 1888, were peculiarly unsuitable for the reception of any new teaching. War had been openly declared in certain quarters between science and religion, and the defenders, wisely enough from a theological point of view, dared not at that stage relinquish a single article of their traditional dogma. Wherefore, except among the very small but increasing numbers of the Theosophists, no heed was paid to Madame Blavatsky's teaching on this particular subject of man's origin.

Sixty years later we are in a position to examine the whole subject, not only with a freer mind but with all the added advantages offered by the record of biological research during the interval. It must, however, be fairly admitted in the first place, that the more academic biologists and their lay disciples still subscribe to the inclusive theory that man was evolved from the amoeba in the course of, say, some five hundred million years, and that in time every stage of his development will be demonstrable. Different schools may dispute as to the instrument. Very few are now satisfied that Darwin's "survival of the fittest", is suffi-

cient alone to account even for the differentiation of species over however long a period. But by some minds the original thesis is accepted as a dogma.

Now, as I submitted in an article to THE ARYAN PATH some eighteen months ago, I find that in my attitude towards such subjects as this one of evolution my own mental influences and development of opinion are very fairly representative of those of the average intelligent Western mind. I was, for instance, a willing convert in the nineties to the inclusive theory of natural selection, read much biology and even comparative anatomy, and spent a great deal of time in the effort to think out for myself the various processes and stages of evolutionary development. And now my final refusal in recent years to subscribe to the crucial doctrine of the theory, namely that man and the anthropoid ape are descended from some common ancestor, as yet unrepresented by any fossil remains, is, I believe, fairly typical of the modern thinker. I came to the verge of this refusal largely as a consequence of my own development, and it was not until I had read *The Secret Doctrine*, that I found the authority I needed. Then, as so often happens, I became aware of a definite satisfaction. My inner knowledge was suddenly objectified, and I recognised the truth I had been seeking.

My merely intelligent process, however, which presented an indication only of the deeper

process that manifests itself finally in such an act of recognition, had come to a reasoned criticism from purely objective data. It was so significant to the unprejudiced that while new discoveries of fossil remains might serve to illustrate minor changes in the evolutionary process, they came no nearer to providing us with any evidence of the "missing link" whose existence had been posited to relate primitive man and the higher apes. Neanderthal man was known to Madame Blavatsky, but there have been many new finds—the Piltdown skull, for example,—since her death, yet none of these relics has bridged the glaring gap she clearly indicated between the brain capacity of the lowest man and the highest ape. *Her argument founded on the data available up to 1888, remains unshaken by all the evidence unearthed in the course of the forty-four years that have since elapsed.*

This fact alone gives the reasonable mind cause for doubt. Scientific theory must conform to the definitions it has explicitly imposed upon itself. And the first of these is that it must cover all the facts, the second, that, other things being equal, the simpler theory is preferable to the more complicated. Wherefore since Darwin's theory of the descent of man fulfils neither definition after sixty years of trial, the layman whom I represent may well abandon it on purely logical grounds.

Moreover anyone who is aware

of the trend of modern thought cannot fail to realise that all the influences, whether scientific or esoteric are steadily moving away from any purely material explanation of man's place in the universe. As regards the influence of recent science, and particularly some of the deductions of mathematical physics, I have already written in *THE ARYAN PATH*, and need not repeat my arguments under that head. It is sufficient to suggest that while science by its own hypotheses can never illuminate the greatest of all mysteries, the secret of life, its findings are no longer so incompatible with the teachings of the ancient Wisdom-Religion as they were when *The Secret Doctrine* was written. In the eighties of the last century the terms "scientist" and "atheist" were almost synonyms in so far as the first implied the second.

The influence that I somewhat vaguely referred to as "esoteric" is not so easily described, but in my personal experience I have found an increasing number of people who feel that neither materialism nor any dogmatic creed satisfies their logical or religious sense. Many minds have been deeply stirred, firstly by the war and secondly by all its consequent evils, the increase of crime and brutality, the immediately following years of reckless self-indulgence, and now the widespread miseries due to economic depression. It is well, I do not doubt, that these punishments should have descended

upon us. They were the inevitable result of that wave of materialism both philosophical and social, which reached its crest at the turn of the century. And though we have not yet reached, I believe, the darkest hour, the effects are slowly beginning to show themselves in this leaning towards mysticism, this tentative searching after a broader, freer and more acceptable belief.

It will be seen that I have passed beyond the confines of my immediate subject to the consideration of larger issues, but my text of "Evolution" was intended to serve mainly as an illustration. It is, indeed, a reasonably representative one. In this relation that sixty year old belief in the evolution of man from the lower animal has been a stumbling block to many intelligent minds. It has, without question, been the most important factor in the mechanistic argument which before some more or less acceptable explanation of man's appearance on earth could be offered, was fatally handicapped by the impossibility of finding any answer to the simple, inevitable question: "How and where did the human race begin", or, since it must have had a begin-

ning, "Who or what was responsible for it?"

Wherefore, I feel that the sooner the Darwinian misconception of man's origin is finally rejected on all hands, the sooner will what is still quite a large number of thinking men and women be released from a restricting and injurious habit of thought. The explanation that Theosophy has to substitute will not be readily understood at first by those who have made no study of the ancient Wisdom-Religion. (The chief essentials will be found in Stanza IX of the second volume of *The Secret Doctrine*, entitled "The Final Evolution of Man").* But those who are sufficiently developed to recognise the truth by the appeal it makes to their own inner knowledge, will soon master the preliminary difficulties.

I would add, in conclusion, that I am by no means alone in my belief that the general average of Western intelligence is ready to accept the teaching of the old Wisdom. And it is the duty of all readers of THE ARYAN PATH to familiarise themselves with that teaching and to pass it on to those who may be ready, to receive it.

J. D. BERESFORD

* See also *The Secret Doctrine*, I. 181, et seq. for Madame Blavatsky's account of the "Triple Evolutionary Scheme",

LIGHT IN LIFE

[**Professor Mahendranath Sircar** of Calcutta Sanskrit College is the author of *System of Vedantic Thought and Culture, Comparative Studies in the Vedanta and Mysticism in Bhagavad Gita*. In this article he makes his contribution to the discussion started by Mr. J. W. T. Mason on "India and Objective Reality," in our September number, and carried forward by Mr. T. Chitnavis, Professor A. R. Wadia, and Mr. Charles Dernier's in September, October and November issues.—EDS.]

A timely and vital discussion finds its place in THE ARYAN PATH regarding India and Objective Reality. The central theme appears to have been clouded in the dust of controversy. The problem raised by Mr. J. W. T. Mason affects the whole world and not India alone.

The civilisation in the West is dominated by the melioristic and pragmatic outlook of life. In its complexity life has need of pragmatic and vitalistic satisfaction. Led by the instinct of what Schopenhauer calls "will-to-live" the West has exhibited wonderful capacity of invention, organisation, speed, efficiency and adventure. Indeed they are assets and valuable assets in life. The western life is dominated by the scientific spirit and vitalistic outlook. Vitalism has its charm. Its appeal lies in the thrill psychosis. Its curse also lies there. It sets a high premium upon the realistic attitude of life and its promises. It may move with the high objective of an efficient society and state. Whatever value it can assimilate in it, it cannot outgrow the *ego*-centric move of life, and even where the great enthusiasm is exhibited for collective organi-

sation and beneficence, it has at bottom an inspiration from the vital-mind which feels in terms of vital-sympathy.

Behind every civilisation, there is vision, sacrifice, effort which may be called spiritual if the superstructure that is raised does really help the finer outpourings of life in love, beauty and dignity. Life's greatest promise lies in creativeness, and the finest creations are a source of disinterested joy for ever. The value of existence, individual or national, lies in the capacity of inspiring disinterested activity and offering disinterested delight. Such creations become possible when life has its living touch with what Mr. Mason calls Ultimate Reality.

Indian civilisation is withdrawn into her inner self and suffers from an over-emphasis on the Ultimate Reality ignoring the free flow of life in creative activity. India suffers from an ebb-tide in vitalism. A deeper intuition, however, tells us that India has pinned her faith in the synthetic view of life. It has not denied life. It has taught us to read true value and significance in it. To the short-sighted the Ultimate Reality might not have any place in the

day-to-day adaptations of life. But the best and the most rational living can only come with wisdom and love, not with insistences and pulls. This wisdom not confined to sectional experience must cover the whole range of life. Now, vitalism cannot satisfy itself, and if it is not attuned to the higher string of life it must kill itself. It knows no rest. The rest must be found elsewhere. The teachers of vitalism in the West have not found satisfaction with it and have been forced to take up the higher tuning of life in spirituality. But this has been the teaching of India for centuries; this has been the foundation of the old Indian civilisation. The soul of India has felt the identity of Spirit that shines in the orb of the Sun with that which resides in the heart of man. In this joyous vision and exaltation, it has found full satisfaction.

The transvaluation of values in the light of Ultimate Reality enabled India to organise her institutions on a spiritual basis and to give her social system a firm footing. If the spirit of divisions has its voice heard at times, the spirit of integrity has worked on the whole most satisfactorily. The realistic claims and pragmatic values have not been ignored; they have been transformed and refined by the touch of higher spirituality. Life has been made the vehicle of spiritual expression and the humanistic services have got the touch of grace.

Science gives us power, it gives us affluence. They are values.

They cannot be ignored. But they are to be subjected to the graces of the soul to add beauty and dignity to them. Life without light is blind. Light without life is ineffective. Evolution proceeds towards the assimilation of light in life; the more complete the assimilation, the better the life. Power loses its sting in the light of wisdom and becomes an instrument of spiritual expression. The reference of life to the Ultimate Reality has enabled India to free itself from the sectional views of life and to take its inspiration from the source divine. It has allowed her an elasticity and freedom from the *ego-centripetal* tendency. It has enabled her to enjoy the charm, the dignity and the joys of life. Life must leave its utilitarian basis to enjoy its own fullness and perfect concord and realise the divine in man and in society. This is the objective goal of civilisation.

Science has broken the barriers of space and time and the dawn of a cosmic humanity is visible on the horizon. If anything can be of true help in this formative period, it will not be life dominated by the sense of objectivity and hedged round by territorial limitation. Life requires this moment the intuition that can see the whole, and the love that can live for the whole. Life in the West running in excessive vitalism and indulging in partialities and surface joys can take its lesson even to-day from India. India is destined to play the higher rôle of exhibiting to the world how every form of

life can be spiritualised by the peace of the soul and the joyousness of the spirit.

The work of the moment is to free life from shibboleths and assimilate the rays of that higher light that never deceives and these forces of protecting power that cannot be conquered.

India has suffered from a defeatist consciousness, but to-day the "charm" of Western life and civilisation stands exposed.

Whatever ills India may suffer from she should not allow herself to cut adrift from the vivid consciousness of Ultimate Reality.

Drawing her inspiration from her ancient programme India must mould her institutions and suffuse them with the forces of spirituality using her power and wealth as instruments for her own self-expression.

India must play her part; she must exhibit that the splendours of life need not blind us to the graces of the soul. Let not the dazzling light of modernism overpower her and leave her weak. Her pressing necessity is the watchful consciousness, which can save her from the surface enchantment, and enable her to walk with silent faith and serene dignity. If in her hour of defeat she did not forsake the touch and the inspiration of life, let her not in the moment of victory forsake the

erring humanity which needs the illumination that spreads out from her. India does not claim that spiritual life is her absolute possession, but that it is the dominant note of her civilisation, and the shaping force of her life. The soul of India must emerge with the wealth of powers at her feet but with the radiance of Spirit in her Face.

The world with all its forward movement and cultural progress is gasping for Peace and that Peace it can find by crying halt to the "abnormal craving for thrills" so often falsely passed for life.

In India spirituality is not a vision of the cloister, its voice is heard in the silence of the soul surrounded by the noise of life. If India is true to her spirit she cannot accept defeat in any sphere of activity and should organise her force to meet the diverse needs of existence. When spirituality is real it finds its expression through the dynamism of life with calmness ever present and the requirement of the moment is not the forsaking of spirituality but embracing its true inspiration, which will express itself through all kinds of creative formations and all phases of life and at the same time will find delight in serene detachment and dignified transcendency.

MAHENDRANATH SIRCAR

THE ANATOMY OF PORTRAITURE

[Robert H. Davis, better known as "Bob Davis", of the *New York Sun*, already the writer of seven travel books, and with Arthur Bartlett Maurice, author of *The Caliph of Bagdad, being the Arabian Night's Flashes of the Life, Letters and Works of O. Henry*, recently brought out, under the title *Man Makes His Own Mask*, a limited edition of 120 selected photographic portraits of celebrities with whom Mr. Davis has come into personal contact during his 400,000 miles of world-touring. Although an amateur, disdaining all the tricks of the camera, making pictures that he declines to retouch in the slightest particular, and operating only in the natural daylight, Mr. Davis has produced a series of portraits so life-like and startling as to attract the attention of camera students throughout the world. For this reason, the editors of THE ARYAN PATH requested him to set forth the principles of his art, and the impelling purpose behind his persistence.—EDS.]

Whatever may be said of the human countenance, it is indubitably a record, revealing in a greater or lesser degree certain characteristics that cannot be concealed. A man may hide in his eyes the cruelty he cannot erase from his mouth; or mask in profile what would be evident in a full-face portrait. By a single gesture of defiance it is quite possible to assume a bearing that in the last analysis would be little more than a manifestation of impudence. The mobile face, with its swiftly altering expressions, its physical interpretations of mood under the animating influence of conversation or the effect of thought, is a source of confusion to photographic perfection. Man's genius for dissembling is a constant barrier to penetration behind the drop curtain. A true portrait is possible only when the sitter is in repose, internal and external, a state of complete relaxation; composure, if you will.

In man's daily life, fraught with complexity, not the least of which is the uncertainty of to-morrow, it

is inevitable that time must needs write the record upon his eyes, his lips, his mouth, and his cheeks. Even the nose is thrust into the auto-biography. The ear is the only feature that remains unchanged in its general shape, its convolutions and its lobes and its placement from the cradle to the grave. Bertillion established that fact in his elaborate analysis of human features. Through muscular control all the other features of the face may be momentarily altered at will, but the ear remains static; forever inert. Some people possess the simian gift of being able to move their ears slightly, a performance that greatly entertains others less acrobatic; but they cannot change the shape of them.

Among seven hundred odd sitters—most of them types—selected from all nations and over a wide range of territory and in all zones, I have found that ninety per cent attach unnecessary importance to the smiling face. The tendency to look cheerful is universal and the subtle influence

of a modified form of mirth, as expressed in the smile, is in consequence unavoidable. Except in remote instances, the slightest physical attempt to express merriment is fatal to portraiture. As a matter of fact, the eye-ball is utterly without expression, a fish-like, glazed object, powerless to convey the slightest indication of joy, sadness, ecstasy, pain or wonder. Only the muscles around the eye give the eye life. Every emotion conveyed through the eye is the product of this muscular activity. And yet the belief is general that the eye is the window of the soul. If they were not endowed with eyelids and lashes our eyes would have the appearance of moss agates in a setting of putty. In fine, a smile erroneously regarded as a product of the eye, is the most fictitious of all human expressions, the more so because it can be summoned at will, as is frequently the case when one desires to create the illusion that all is bright and fair, even though the heart bleeds and the soul is disturbed.

Assuming that there is anatomy to portraiture, which involves the structure of the face as a whole, it seems to be essential that the true art consists of reproducing the unit under the most advantageous circumstances with due regard for the component relations. And it is equally desirable to interpret, to the fullest possible extent, the finer traits and nobler qualities of the sitter, without sacrificing the physical definitions. To me the act of retouch-

ing out the blemishes in a face, or altering in the slightest particular the contours and lines that are evident, writ by man's Maker, and set down as incontrovertible records, is distasteful to the last degree. And it is equally repugnant to achieve, by the use of artificial lights and reflections, beneficial effects calculated to present the countenance in a favourable but unnatural glamour. It is preferable that posterity look upon my contemporaries as they appear under normal circumstances in whatever natural daylight is contributed by Nature. What the human eye sees so does the camera's lens see. More than that it penetrates deep into man's consciousness, revealing characteristics that the most discerning photographer knows not of when making the portrait.

Among my negatives are men of noble mien who disclose the taint of evil; giants who are pigmies at heart; saints who cannot hide the dual nature in their countenance; heavy-lidded, dull mortals who in a different environment would have been apostles; cheerful persons who are ingrates in deed; serene men who could lead an army in a Christian cause, and captains of industry, who should be carrying a lunch bucket; and there are faces of those who will live in the centuries to come and upon whom the next generation will look with favour and admiration, and see and know them as they were in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. For each sitter I have written a three

hundred word biography, striving with my pen as with my camera to present the better side. Perchance historians will have occasion to quote my notes, or to amend or even distort, a condition that is beyond my control.

But my pictures of those who made their own masks will be indestructible evidence, and will stand for better or for worse. I

have willed the collection to a public library where students interested in twentieth century ethnology may examine—if I survive for another decade—at least two thousand life-sized portraits of good, bad and indifferent mortals whom I embalmed through the lens of my camera, and left behind that all may see.

ROBERT H. DAVIS

“THE PROOF OF IT”

In the days of Jesus men asked for a sign, and to-day, the question “Where is the proof?” is probably the first to arise upon contact with spiritual ideas that are strange to the hearer. The natural answer to such a question must be: “Could you recognize the proof if you had it? Proof is no hard-and-fast thing.” Patanjali, in his Yoga Aphorisms, has defined it for us. “Correct Cognition,” he says, “results from Perception, Inference, and Testimony.” The independent evidence of others capable of verifying the proof must corroborate the result of one’s own perception, and both must be checked up in the light of clear reason.

Dependance on perception alone, gives “the lunatic, the lover and the poet”; that is, the fanatic, the misguided mystic taking a partial experience for the whole truth, secondly, the so-called devotee and worshipper, scorning reason and following only the guidance of “the Inner Light,”

and lastly, the poet, whose intuition soars higher than the man himself can consciously reach. Dependance on inference and reason alone, leads to arid speculation, because of the tendency of the human mind to weave a maze of conclusions without sufficient data. And dependance on evidence alone, leads to inertia and blind faith in authorities and dogmas.

So that he who would prove the spiritual truths must study the accumulated testimony of the Great Ones, must test practically the hypotheses that can be inferred workable, until the perception of the *actuality* of those truths springs up spontaneously in the progress of time. Yet in some measure all three processes are simultaneous, the study of material records, the inner activity of the mind, the over-brooding working of the omniscient, omnipotent Spirit. “Proof” is his alone who holds the balance true between all aspects of his nature.

E. W.

THE DOCTRINE OF RE-INCARNATION IN ISLAMIC LITERATURE

[Dr. Margaret Smith's studies in Islamic mysticism have already appeared in our pages. In the following article she shows how Reincarnation was taught and accepted by numerous sects of Islam. Our author refers to the Sufis "rejecting" reincarnation and yet teaching that "the future destiny of the soul depended upon its own efforts towards spiritual perfection". The Sufis very probably taught Reincarnation, in some mystic form in their exoteric degree, reserving for their esotericists the details of the doctrine.—EDS.]

The doctrine of Re-incarnation, in the form of the belief in the passage of the human soul from one body to another, with the ethical implication that the lot of the soul on earth in each new incarnation is determined by its conduct in a former life, and that the progress of the soul onward and upward depends therefore on its own efforts here and now, is not to be found in orthodox Islam. It is, in fact, regarded as a heresy by the orthodox Muslim theologians. Muslim authors who deal with the subject from the standpoint of theology, such as Sharaṣṭānī (ob. 1153 A. D.), who considers it in his *Kitāb al-Milal wa'l-Nihal* (Book of Religions and Sects), attribute it to Indian rather than Pythagorean influence, but it is to be noted that those Islamic sects which adopted the doctrine were undoubtedly acquainted with the teaching of the Greek philosophers.

The doctrine was accepted at an early period in the history of Islam by certain of the Muṭazilites, one of the oldest theological sects in Islam. The origin of the Muṭazilites is said to

have been due to the secession of a certain Persian named Wāṣil b. ʿAta al-Ghazzāl, from among the disciples of the famous ascetic Ḥasan of Basra (ob. A. D. 728), and if so, then the sect had its rise in Iraq, where Persian and Arab thought intermingled and Indian influence was possible. It is more probable, however, that their doctrines were developed under the influence of Byzantine theologians, and especially of John of Damascus, who lived in the eighth century, and his pupil Theodore Abū Qurra.

The Muṭazilites were probably among the first to study the Arabic translations of the Greek naturalists and philosophers which appeared in the reigns of the Caliphs al-Manṣūr and al-Ma'mūn, and these turned their thoughts into new directions, and led them to seek to combine Greek culture with Islamic theology. They concerned themselves with the problem of pre-destination and freewill; they also sought to purge the Qur'ān of anthropomorphism, and regarded those who separated the Divine Attributes from the Divine Essence as being really

polytheists. They taught, further, that all the truths necessary for salvation could be acquired by the light of reason, so that man, at all times and in all places, ought to make himself acquainted with these truths. Some of the Mu^tazilites held the doctrine of re-incarnation, and notably certain of the disciples of Nazzām, a well-known Mu^tazilite who died in A.D. 845. The two most prominent in the teaching of the doctrine were Aḥmad b. Ḥābiṭ (or Hā'it), and Faḍl al-Ḥudathī, who held that God created the souls of men free from defect, pure and rational, before their existence in this world, and gave them knowledge about Himself and the power to know Him directly, and bestowed upon them His Divine grace. Some, when they pass into this world, obey the Divine Law in all respects, while others disobey it in its entirety, while others again at times act rightly and at times sin. At the death of the body, they taught, the righteous are welcomed to the abode of the Blessed, those who have sinned incessantly are thrust into Hell, but those who are neither decisively bad nor decisively good pass into other bodies and are tested by misfortunes and hardships as well as by ease, and by pains and joys in different measure according to the degree of their sins. That one whose merits were greater than his sins is re-born to a higher state and suffers less than the one whose sins outweighed his good deeds. Such souls do not cease to pass from

one re-incarnation to another, age after age, so long as they are not cleansed from their sins, but when perfected, they attain to salvation. Others, too, of the disciples of Nazzām followed these two in respect of this doctrine.

The Mu^tazilites proper came to an end with the fourth century of the Islamic era, but their doctrines were often combined with those of the Shī'ites, who were contemporary with them, but with a far-reaching influence which lasted to a much later period. The Shī'ites were in the first place a political section, the *Shī'a* or partisans of 'Alī, the fourth Caliph, whose wife Fāṭima was the daughter of the Prophet, whose children and their descendants, the Shī'ites held to have a Divine Right to the Imamate, *i.e.* the supreme authority in Islam, both temporal and spiritual. Certain of the extreme Shī'ites, known as the *Ghulāt*, held not only the doctrine of the incarnation of the Deity in a human form (that of the Imām), but also that of the re-incarnation of ordinary human souls. Among these were the Rawandiyya of Khurasān, of whom Tabarī the historian (ob. 923 A.D.) states that they were still in existence in his own time and that they held this doctrine, and the Khurramiyya another Shī'ite sect of this same period, appear to have taught it.

The Shī'ites developed numerous sects and not a few of these taught the doctrine of re-incarnation. Chief among these were the

Ismā'īlis, who took their name from Ismā'īl, son of the sixth Imām, who died during his father's life-time. His son Muḥamad was regarded by the Ismā'īlis as the Seventh and Last Imām, and by some of them as a re-incarnation of his father. But the real founder of the Ismā'īlī sect, who taught a distinctive religious doctrine, which had a far-reaching influence for the next four centuries, was ʿAbdallāh b. Maymūn al-Qaddāḥ (ob. 874 A.D.), the son of a Persian oculist, who himself belonged to the *Ghulāt* sect. ʿAbdallāh's object was to bind together the free-thinkers of the time into one secret society. The Ismā'īlis borrowed something of the doctrine from the Muʿtazilites, but ʿAbdallāh really aimed at a synthesis of the leading ideas of his time, including Greek Philosophy, Christianity, Gnosticism, Judaism, and doctrines taken from the religion of ancient Persia, and the faiths of India. Elements from all of these were to form a secret doctrine, to be gradually revealed to the initiated by the Imām. The Ismā'īlis were known to their contemporaries as the *Bāṭiniyya* (Esoterics), since they held that there was an inner part to every external, a spirit to every form, a hidden meaning to every revelation, and to every similitude in this world a corresponding reality in the other world.

Their doctrine of the nature of God was Neo-Platonic: They taught that He was entirely without attributes and incompre-

hensible, since His Nature admits of no predication. This Absolute Godhead, the Primal Unity, manifested itself as Universal Reason, in which are contained all the Divine attributes, being God in His outward manifestation. Universal Reason (the Primal Intelligence) represents the real Divinity of the Ismā'īlis, and is called by them the "Veil," the "Antecedent," the "First," the "Spirit". Universal Reason produced Universal Soul, which in its turn created the heavens and the visible universe, manifesting itself in plurality, through which phase it passes in order to return again to its original Unity.

The individual soul is an epitome of the whole universe, and the latter exists only for the progressive education of the soul. Man cannot attain to the truth by unaided reason, but needs the teaching of Universal Reason, to be obtained only from the Imām of the time, for Universal Reason becomes incarnate from time to time in the form of a Leader or Teacher (*nāṭiq*) and teaches more fully and completely in each successive manifestation, illuminating souls according to their experience and understanding, and giving them the spiritual truths necessary for their guidance. The Ismā'īlis taught that six great Prophetic cycles, those of Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad, had already passed, and the last and seventh cycle had been inaugurated by Muhammad b. Ismā'īl, the last of the Imāms, and in this cycle, for the

first time, the real esoteric doctrine, revealing the true inward teaching of the Law and the Prophets, was made clear.

This inner doctrine, reserved for the fully-initiated, was dominated by the mystic number seven. The principle of Seven Prophetic cycles corresponded with the Emanations of Being—Universal Reason, Universal Soul, Primal Matter, Space and Time, which, with the Absolute Godhead, and Man, made up the Sevenfold universe, and was typified by the Seven degrees of initiation through which the seeker advanced towards the innermost doctrine, according to his receptivity. In the first three of these the neophyte was bound to secrecy, and taught that the Law of Islam was but the outward symbol of the secret doctrine entrusted to the Imām, and he was instructed as to the nature and number of the Imāms. He was then taught the doctrine of the Prophetic cycles, and learnt that with the Seventh and last Leader, an end was put to the knowledge of those who went before (*‘Ulūm al-awwalīn*), and the Esoteric *bāṭinī* doctrine, together with the knowledge of symbolical interpretation (*ta’wīl*), was inaugurated. In succeeding degrees he was taught to ignore the outward observances of religion and to understand their inner significance. He then learnt that above all Before and After is a Being Who has neither name nor attribute, Who is not cognisable and Who cannot therefore be wor-

shipped. In the final degree of initiation all dogmatic religion was cast aside and the initiate became a philosopher, free to adopt such system or admixture of systems as he might choose, for to him every religious ceremony and every natural object represented but a type or symbol of the esoteric mysteries, meaningless to the formalist, but, to the initiated, full of beauty and significance.

To gain salvation, then, the soul must attain to knowledge, and this could only be gained through the earthly incarnation of Universal Reason. Paradise was regarded as symbolising the state of the soul which had reached perfect knowledge and could be re-united with its Source. Hell symbolised ignorance, but no soul was condemned eternally to Hell, for it returned to earth by successive re-incarnations, until it had cleansed itself of its errors and was able to recognise the Imām of the time and from him to learn the true knowledge. Gradually, through many lives, the soul was guided, as its experience and understanding increased in successive incarnations, through the sphere of plurality, to its final abode in the world of eternal Unity. The Ismā‘īlīs held that evil had no real or lasting existence and would gradually disappear through the progressive assimilation of all creation to Universal Reason.

In the time of the Fāṭimide caliphs (A. D. 969 onwards) Ismā‘īlī doctrines were publicly taught in Cairo in schools well en-

lowed and provided with good libraries, and those who taught had large numbers of students, who crowded to their lectures. It was a principle with the sect that men should be converted by persuasion, so that they shewed the greatest tolerance to other sects. The Buwayhid dynasty, who reigned in Western Persia A. D. 332 to 1055, and were Shī'ites, were also favourable to the doctrine. There is an account in the Annals of the historian Abū al-Mahāsīn for the year 952 A. D., telling how certain persons were arrested for heresy, among them being a youth who declared that the spirit of one of the caliphs had passed into his body, and a woman who declared that she was a re-incarnation of Fāṭima, the daughter of the Prophet. The Buwayhid ruler ordered that they should be released, because he himself accepted the doctrine of re-incarnation.

The Druses*, though not accepted by orthodox Muslims as belonging to Islam, yet call themselves Muslims when with Muslims, and their religion is also an esoteric doctrine, akin to that of the Ismā'īlis, while of their founders Ḥamza and Darazī, the latter was in the service of the Fāṭimid ruler al-Ḥākim, himself an adherent of the Ismā'īlī sect. Ḥamza, in a treatise setting forth the doctrines of the sect, states that the body is to be regarded simply as an envelope, and during his tenure of

it a man may make progress or go backwards. The number of souls in existence neither increases nor diminishes, but these re-appear in different human forms, according to what they have merited by their works, good or evil, in a previous incarnation, so that a man's body may be the means of doing him good or a means of punishment, but Ḥamza maintains that men are punished in such a way that they understand and know that it is punishment, and therefore it is able to serve them as instruction and lead them to repentance. The beauty or deformity of the body to which the soul is attached in its various re-incarnations has therefore a relation to its purity or corruption. The reward which a man receives in passing from body to body is the increase of knowledge, and advance in spiritual power until he attains to the rank of the Imamate. So that when souls have attained, by their knowledge and their comprehension of the Unity, to the final degree of perfection, they cease to experience re-incarnation and are definitely united to the Imām. Yet this will not happen until, having been subject to re-incarnation through all the cycles, they reach the last. Then the souls come to judgment, and those who have acquired perfection by union are separated from the body by death, and are no longer subject to re-birth, but are re-united, and

* "Lamas and Druses" by H. P. Blavatsky appeared in *The Theosophist* for June 1881 to which we draw the attention of interested readers. In that article important facts about the Druses are given and a significant comparison between them and the Tibetan Lamas is made.

forever, with the Imām, that is, with the Divine Principle.

There are still many Ismā'īlis, including the kindred sects of the Druses, to be found to-day, especially in Syria, but also in Persia, Afghanistan and India (where their hereditary head is the Agha Khan), and elsewhere, including Zanzibar and East Africa.

The doctrine found little acceptance among the Šūfis generally, though his enemies accused the great mystic teacher Manṣūr al-Ḥallaj, who died a martyr at Baghdad in A. D. 922, of teaching the doctrine that the soul could return to the world in another body, and of declaring that certain of his disciples were re-incarnations of the great prophets of the past. As al-Ḥallaj was in close touch with Ismā'īlī sects, it is possible that he was influenced by their teaching in this respect. The doctrine was well-known however to the Šūfis, and Hujwī-rī, author of the *Kashf al-Mahjūb* (The Unveiling of the Veiled), who died in A. D. 1097, while himself refusing to accept it, speaks of those who assert that the spirit is eternal (*i. e.* uncreated), and aver that it passes from one body to another. The doctrine, he says, was widely accepted in his time, and he includes among those who held it the Christians "though they express it in terms that appear to conflict with it," and by all the Indians, Thibetans and Chinese, and by most of the Shī'ites the

Qarmitēs, Ismā'īlīs and kindred sects. At the same time, while nearly all the Šūfis rejected re-incarnation, they did, of course, teach that the future destiny of the soul depended upon its own efforts towards spiritual perfection (together with the Divine help), and only those who had purified themselves from sin and error could attain to the goal of union with the One.

On the other hand, the doctrine found some acceptance among Islamic philosophers, including certain of them who were also mystics. Among these was al-Fārābī (ob. A. D. 950), of Turkish origin, who lived and taught in Baghdad, and was the greatest philosopher of Islam before Avicenna. al-Fārābī held that morality could reach perfection only in a State which was also a spiritual community, that is, guided by spiritual principles. The souls of those who had been born into an "ignorant" state must undergo re-incarnation, in order to gain the knowledge necessary for the attainment of perfection, and finally, of absorption in the All. Other philosopher-mystics who held the doctrine of re-incarnation were Avicenna (ob. A. D. 1037) and Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī al-Ishrāqī (ob. A. D. 1191)* both of whom held that erring souls must return to this earth, and take up a body determined by the experiences of the previous life, in order to fit themselves to return ultimately to their Source.

* Cf. my articles on Avicenna and Suhrawardī al-Ishrādī in THE ARYAN PATH for August 1932 and October 1193.

The doctrine of re-incarnation has re-appeared in modern times in the literature of the Bābīs and Bahā'is, of Persia, the followers of Mirza 'Ali Muhammad (ob. A.D. 1850) and his successor Bahā'allah. They were originally Shi'ite sect, but diverged more and more from Islam as time went on. They hold that the absolute Reality is an eternal, living, impersonal Essence, manifesting itself through the Universe. In all forms of life there is an immortal part, the ray of Eternal Love, which survives the body. Salvation consists in the discovery of this ray of Love, which is the motive-power of all noble and unselfish action, within each con-

scious being. After the death of the body, the soul returns to this earth by re-incarnation, in order to continue the search and to make further progress until it is gradually perfected and realises its oneness with the Absolute Reality.

The doctrine of Re-incarnation, therefore has been well-known to Islamic writers from an early period, and though regarded as a heresy by orthodox Islam and rejected by most of the great Sūfī teachers, it has been widely accepted, and is still held to-day, by certain influential Islamic sects, mainly of Persian origin, who are to be found in most parts of the Islamic world.*

MARGARET SMITH

After allowing the Soul, escaped from the pangs of personal life, a sufficient, yes, a hundredfold compensation, Karma, with its army of Skandhas, waits at the threshold of Devachan, whence the *Ego* re-emerges to assume a new incarnation. . . . The new "personality" is no better than a fresh suit of clothes with its specific characteristics, colour, form and qualities; but the *real* man who wears it is the same culprit as of old. It is the *individuality* who suffers through his personality." And it is this, and this alone, that can account for the terrible, still only *apparent*, injustice in the distribution of lots in life to man Shakespeare must have thought of it when writing on the worthlessness of Birth. Remember his words:

Why should my birth keep down my mounting spirit?
Are not all creatures subject unto time?
There's legions now of beggars on the earth,
That their original did spring from Kings,
And many monarchs now, whose fathers were
The riff-raff of their age

Alter the word "fathers" into "Egos"—and you will have the truth.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Key to Theosophy*, pp. 117, 118.

* The subject is discussed by the Arabic writers Shahrastānī in his *Kitāb al-Milāl wa'l-Niha* and Tabarī in his *Annales* and by the Persian Hujwiri in the *Kashf al-Mahjūb*. Cf. also de Sacy *Exposé de la Religion des Druzes* (Paris 1838) and M. Iqbal *Development of Metaphysics in Persia* (London 1918).

A PATTERN FOR STATESMEN

[Hugh P.A. Fausset's article is both timely and useful. In the mad rush of holding conferences, debating issues, finding diplomatic words which evade and hide when they are supposed to enlighten and guide; of finding temporary means to postpone the impending doom in the vague hope of "something must happen"; of going round and round; modern financiers, politicians and administrators are seeking for some light. This article offers it. Will they take it? It was Marcus Aurelius who said that "neither in writing nor in reading wilt thou be able to lay down rules for others before thou shalt have learned to obey rules thyself."—EDS.]

One of the tragedies of human history is the want of collaboration in almost all ages between the idealist and the realist. Again and again the inspired man has flung the challenge of his absolute convictions in the face of the world, but he has been inevitably opposed not merely by the inertia of humanity in the mass but by the scepticism of the opportunist, of the man who believes in meeting every situation as it arises and who through his very respect for an actuality outside himself is reasonably suspicious of all who seem to override or disregard the contingent or who would govern conduct by visionary principles. And when we remember the ways of the idealists, whether religious or political, who have in the past been in a position to enforce their idealism upon their fellows, we cannot but regretfully admit the justification of the realist's suspicion. Very many of the worst cruelties under which man has groaned down the ages have been inflicted in the name of idealism. But apart from the fanatical perversities of egotists of genius we have the only less pitiful spectacle of the ineffectual idealist. An obvious example of this is the

high-minded and humanitarian altruist whose appeal to self-sacrifice falls on deaf ears because he himself has failed to face the fact that the self-assertive principle is as deeply rooted in the nature of man as the co-operative. His altruism therefore springs rather out of weakness than strength. It lacks the tension of a true polarity and the selfish man instinctively rejects a gospel which fails to satisfy by really accepting and sublimating the self-centredness which he knows to be a determining factor in human nature. The few great religious teachers of mankind have of course never made this mistake. However extreme in their staggering simplicity their ultimate spiritual demands have been, they have never either evaded, or violated the conditions within which these demands must be satisfied. They have come not to deny the law of necessity but to fulfil it in a liberty grounded in the very nature of things. Nevertheless being primarily concerned with the eternal end rather than the temporal process, their demands have inevitably seemed so relentlessly absolute to man toiling in the council-chambers and the

market places of the world as to be almost irrelevant. And this is perhaps particularly true in this present age of rationality and relativity. Our modern rulers whether they be politicians or business-men, are therefore more likely to be persuaded by the example of successful administrators who were also idealists than by illuminated world-saviours. Compelled so often themselves to take the path of compromise they are always in danger of surrendering to mere expediency. And from this descent into uninspired realism they can only be recalled by a teacher who was also like themselves a man of affairs, an idealist who was

not too bright or good
For human nature's daily food.

Two figures suggest themselves as perhaps pre-eminently suitable to satisfy these requirements and provide example and an inspiration not only to those who may profoundly influence the political and social development of the modern world, but to that host of hard working men and women who really maintain its complex and creaking mechanism. These are Asoka, the Buddhist, and Marcus Aurelius, the Stoic. Of the two Asoka was the more successful in realizing his principles in the practice of kingship. But he was also the more fortunate in his times and circumstance, and although we know in bare outline the greatness of his achievement and can deduce from this the rare quality of his humanity, he remains inevitably a somewhat

legendary and remote figure. Not so Marcus Aurelius. He can speak to us through his *Meditations* as intimately and persuasively to-day as when he wrote them eighteen hundred years ago. And although the mystic will always find something wanting in the creed by which this most gentle and dutiful of all the Roman Emperors lived, the very temperateness of his counsel, his inability to transcend limits which to the ordinary man are final, make of his *Meditations* an ideal hand-book of practical and moral wisdom for those who are engaged in the spade work of modern civilization. Here, if anywhere, we have the testament of one who deserved Plato's title of philosopher-king, one whose philosophy was rooted in his inner experience, nurtured by the best thought of his time, and tested in the rude commerce of the world. That it stood the test is proved not only by the calm integrity of Aurelius's inner life, but by his effectiveness as a statesman. It is one of fate's ironies that so peaceful and retiring a man should have been set at the head of the Roman Empire when it was threatened with great dangers both from without and within, and when the seeds of ultimate decline were already deeply rooted. But so far as any man could, he arrested their growth. Far from cultivating his mind in retirement, for several years he commanded his armies in the field establishing within himself an inner quiet which even the clangour

of arms could not disturb. And his wars, though slow were successful while he had the wisdom to foresee the danger to Rome from the Barbarians of the North and to meet it with measures which preserved the integrity of the Empire for two centuries.

That so peaceful and contemplative a man should have been involved in war and all the harassments of statesmanship and administration is, therefore, more instructive than ironic. For men of action cannot but respect and may be drawn to study a philosophy which proved its worth in circumstances kindred to their own. In what then did Marcus Aurelius's philosophy consist? Obviously we cannot answer such a question adequately in the small space at our disposal. We can at most suggest why it is so peculiarly relevant to an age which questions the absolutes of religion but needs so desperately the inspiration of a rational faith. To say that Marcus Aurelius was a Stoic is misleading. For to most men Stoicism suggests an attitude of grim resignation or heroic indifference. And although there was an element of what another writer has happily called 'strenuous weariness in Aurelius's attitude to life, it was a subordinate one. He combined in fact to a rare degree reason and aspiration, faith and doubt. At moments in his *Meditations* he can play with the theory of Epicurus that, "atoms be the cause of all things and that life be nothing else but a mere dispersion," but this clearly was not

his own conviction. For he could write elsewhere of the Gods that "by the daily experience that I have of their power and providence towards myself and others I know certainly that they are, and therefore worship them". Nevertheless although his life had this religious basis, his faith was never so certain or so transcendent as to deflect his gaze from the immediate and actual world of men and nature. "Without relation unto God," he wrote, "thou shall never speed in any worldly actions; nor on the other side in any divine, without some respect had to things human". And it was on the human that he concentrated. In human life there are two principles manifestly at work, reason and natural impulse. Ideally these two principles should work together in harmony—for man's reason, although it evolves later, is essentially a kindred faculty to his instinct. But in fact, as we know, a conflict between reason and natural impulse is a condition of man's development. It is not reason itself which creates the conflict but the will which, falling into selfishness, exploits both the rational and instinctive faculties, so perverting them and bringing them into opposition. Human history embodies the drama of this tragic but necessary conflict. For out of the self-will that generated it has grown the self-consciousness which may ultimately resolve it. Man has increasingly come to realize that human happiness depends upon satisfying the demands of nature

and of reason. But so long as these demands seem to conflict, he is wretchedly torn between them. Hence the rival or delusively associated states of nature and of reason to which the philosophers of the eighteenth century sought to transport their disciples. But to-day the armed frontiers between these two states are beginning to be broken down. There is at least some hopeful commerce and co-operation between them. Consequently we should be more than ordinarily receptive to the philosophy of a man who taught and experienced in his own person the truth that "to a reasonable creature, the same action is both according to nature, and according to reason".

Marcus Aurelius possessed so civilized and equable a temperament that he tended perhaps to underestimate the unruly forces which disputed the calm sway of reason in men less advanced and attuned than himself. For although "to understand and to be reasonable" was potentially "common unto all men," the difficulties in the way of realizing this common principle were formidable. To many even of our own time his contention for example that men are "allied one to another by a kindred not of blood, nor of seed, but of the same mind," may seem to contradict the facts of life. Yet there was never a time perhaps when the facts of life more clearly demonstrated its truth, if only in the spectacle of a world heading for bankruptcy through preferring the kinship of blood to that of

reason. And if Marcus Aurelius's trust in the innate reasonableness of men was premature in an age and an Empire which were still near to the primitive and menaced by the barbarous, it is surely acceptable to-day when the acids of thought have eaten so far into the natural man, when even the barbarians amongst us have to submit to some education, and when economic fact as well as enlightened reason attest the truth that we are "partners in some one commonwealth" and that "the world is as it were a city".

We do not usually conceive of reason as an unifying principle because it has for so long been associated with rationalism. But the reason which Marcus Aurelius commended to all who would live the good life was so far from being an exclusive and separating faculty that he described it as "reason by which men are sociable," contrasting it with "opinion" or wilful selfish thought which blinded the eyes of true understanding. And if in some of his references to the material world he betrayed the disgusted recoil of the too fastidious man, there is never a suggestion in all his writings of the privileged aristocrat's disdain for the common people or of a false withdrawal from their needs and interests. No one to be sure could insist more persuasively than he upon the necessity of a true self-sufficiency, as when he wrote,—

Wind up thyself into thyself. Such is the nature of thy reasonable commanding part, as that if it exercise

justice, and have by that means tranquillity within itself it doth rest fully satisfied with itself without any other thing.

But in the same breath he could remark—"Wipe off all opinion" and exhort men to "the continual habit and exercise both of reason and sociableness". Freedom of outer action, he knew, depended on the realization of the freedom within the self, and his *Meditations* are full of the most admirable counsel on how this state of inner harmony may be achieved and maintained. But although centred in the Self, it was no selfish harmony. A true inward harmony he insisted, was reflected in a perfect outward sympathy. "As proper is it," he wrote, "and natural to the soul of man to love her neighbour, to be true and modest; and to regard nothing so much as herself." And again,— "Fancy not anything else in the world any more to be of any weight and moment but this, to do that only which thine own nature doth require; and to conform thyself to that which the common nature doth afford." He knew, in short, that a true and completed self-love is the condition and complement of a disinterested love for humanity, just as a true self-respect necessitates respect for the natures and even the prejudices of each one of our fellow-men.

And by his repeated affirmations of the unity of mankind Marcus Aurelius proved himself to be not only a wise man and a great Emperor, but a citizen of the world. "He raises sedition in

the city," he wrote, "who by irrational actions withdraws his own soul from that one and common soul of all rational creatures". Or again,— "A branch cut off from the continuity of that which was next unto it, must needs be cut off from the whole tree: so a man that is divided from another man, is divided from the whole society." Or again,— "Now that is ever best and most seasonable, which is for the good of whole."

In him, therefore, we have a very rare kind of teacher, one who combined a superior mind with a real feeling of his membership of a common society. And his teaching is peculiarly accessory and relevant to our times because we are more ready to listen to the pleadings of reason than to accept the challenges of faith, and because it is essential to the survival of civilization that we should substitute a reason that unites for a rationalism that divides. Certainly for those who are likely to influence or direct the political or social life of our disintegrated world there could hardly be a more helpful teacher. For if we have outgrown the naïve delusions of democratic liberalism, we have still to discover or recover the secret of true leadership. Democracy needs leaders who represent at once its best mind and its deepest instincts. Only through such leaders can the common man realize his inherent will to order and unity and be saved from the predatory individuals who would exploit his ignorance and his own lower pas-

ions. But hitherto such leadership has been abysmally lacking. And this is because those in positions of responsibility have been too conscious of their own divided motives to trust the response of the ordinary man to generous and high-minded action. Far from expressing and evoking the best will of those they are supposed to lead, they have too often timidly compromised with the worst. As a corrective to such leadership from behind Marcus Aurelius's teaching and example could hardly be bettered. For in him we have a man who combined as few in positions of authority have done the best qualities of the aristocrat and the democrat and combined them in a living whole. He was an aristocrat in his sensitiveness, his detachment, his cool intelligence, his sense of duty and responsibility and his self-control. But he was a democrat in his modesty, his sympathy, his simplicity, and his abiding sense of the interrelationship of all things and the interdependence of individual and common good. In him we have a man who was equally moulded by his inward thoughts and responsive to his fellow's needs, and who achieved a rare and fertile balance between the mind that would separate and the instinct that would unite. He conceived the true nature of man because he had realized his own true nature. And so he was qualified to be a leader both by his superiority to and his identity with the common man. And it is just

such an integrity which is required of those who in this age would be alike enlightened and effective leaders of their own people and citizens of the world. For even more than in Marcus Aurelius's time is it true that they cannot be the one without the other. And in his *Meditations* they will find a spiritual philosophy which is also reasonable and practical and in which the self is neither falsely asserted nor denied, but reasonably fulfilled, just as the partial self of jealous nationalism must be fulfilled in the total self of a co-operating world. To the mystic, as we have said, the noble poise of Marcus Aurelius must always lack the final illumination of rebirth, although judged by ordinary human standards he had learnt and could teach how "thou thyself shalt become a new man and begin a new life". But for him, burdened with the responsibilities of an empire, the act of true living in this world was "more like a wrestler's than a dancer's practice". Since, however, the majority of us cannot pass like the saint beyond the press and conflict of mundane affairs into the pure dance of the creative spirit, we will do well to ponder and assimilate his teaching. For few can show us better in what conscious disinterestedness consists or help us more effectively to bridge the gulf, so fatal to the modern world, between the idealist and the realist, reason and life, the self and the common soul of mankind.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

INDIA—WHITHER ?*

[**Franklin Edgerton** is professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology at Yale University. He was Editor of *The Journal of the American Oriental Society* from 1918-1926. He is the author of *Panchatantra Reconstructed* (2 vols) and numerous other books. In this article he reviews an old volume published in 1914-15 in which Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson made some striking comments on the future progress of India. We had hopes of securing the opinions of Mr. Dickinson on the subject matter of this review when occurred his death, which the world of culture greatly mourns.—EDS.]

Mr. Lowes Dickinson's "Essay" is on the whole a keen, fair, and enlightened summary of the contrasts between the three Eastern cultures and that of the West. Most of the descriptive parts were true then and are true now. On one point, art and craftsmanship, he fails signally to do justice to India. It is amazing to read that "the art of India has, as art, little or no value," even with the concession that this is "a highly controversial opinion". I think it is a definitely false one. It is enough to refer to the paintings and carvings of Ajanta, Ellora, and Karle, the temples of Bhuvaneshwar and Konarak in Orissa, of Mahabalipuram, Somnathpur, and Halebid in the south, and of Mount Abu in the West; not to mention the older Buddhist art of such places as Sanchi. I do not see how any one with artistic sense could fail to be charmed by all of these. Perhaps Mr. Dickinson was so unfortunate as not to see the best products of Indian art. But even more surprisingly, he says that he "saw nowhere any modern products, whether in

brasswork, wood-carving, embroidery, or enamel, which seemed to [him] to have any merit". Did he not see the exquisite brasswork of Jaipur, the fine wood-carving of Kashmir, the filmy silk scarfs of Benares, all of which certainly compare well with the best corresponding work of Western artisans? And these examples are not isolated. There is undoubtedly too much slavish imitation of the West in India; but taste in artisanry is still not dead there.

In general, however, he sees, and presents ably the reasons for his belief that "throughout the East there has been a development of culture in some respects more important and higher than that of the modern West." Life in the East, he finds, is at once simpler and finer. The material needs of men are satisfied more easily and they have more leisure for things which make life worth living. Even the peasants, he thinks, get "if not happiness, at least a certain dignity and breadth of outlook". The religious, literary and artistic productions of the East he regards as not "in them-

* *An Essay on the Civilizations of India, China and Japan* by G. LOWES DICKINSON.

elves the purpose of human life, but rather as signs that that purpose is being fulfilled".

The West, on the other hand, is far ahead of the East in "the machinery of life"—in science, particularly applied science. This makes life more practical, and also more intense. Some obvious advantages ensue from this; "but at the same time it has almost destroyed the beauty of life and the faculty of disinterested contemplation."

What interests Mr. Dickinson particularly is the clash between the two cultures, and the question whether any fusion between them is possible. He "used to think," he tells us, that each might adopt the best features of the other and so correct its own defects, "and that a synthesis might result which would be more comprehensively human". The East might become more practical without losing its depth and richness of living, the West might learn from the East the higher values of life. His observations in the East made him doubt this possibility. He came to believe that "civilization is a whole," and cannot be transferred in parts. It all hangs together, and if the East adopts our practicality, it must also adopt our excesses, it must "go right through, not round, all that we have been through". This, he thinks, will actually happen; the East will lose what remains of its achievement in these directions and become as 'materialistic,' as the West," although he recognizes the possibility that both

East and West may later, by internal development, "recover a new and genuine spiritual life".

The positive evidence looking in this direction is probably quite as strong as when he wrote. It is an observed fact that Orientals who adopt the practical or "material" advantages of Western culture seem, generally speaking, to adopt all the rest of it, and to lose contact with their own "higher" traditions. Of course there are exceptions, but they are rare. Whether Indian, Chinese, or Japanese, they tend indeed to become almost more "Western" and "materialistic" than Westerners; and that they lose something in the process will, perhaps, be granted even by those who think they gain enough to make the loss worth while. Moreover, in so far as the broader and more social aspects of Westernism penetrate the East, they manifest the same features through which the West passed a century or so ago. Indian and Japanese industrialism is primitive and inhuman, compared even with its not too humanized equivalent in the modern West. It seems, indeed, to be going "through, not round" our "excesses". It has not learned from our mistakes.

Mr. Dickinson's view is very interesting. I think it is too early to say whether it will prove true or not. There is, however, something to be said on the other side; more than when he wrote. Without claiming that the following remarks disprove his opinion, I shall point out certain counterac-

acting tendencies.

In the first place, the Westernization of Orientals is the direct result of their education. The Chinese revolutionary leaders were mostly educated in the United States; naturally they became practically Americans. Most Indian universities and colleges are built on British or American models. Their curricula show only a little fumbling adaptation to Indian conditions. Now a man's character is primarily, or at least very largely, determined by his education. If all the youth of a country (no matter what country) are trained to look at life from the Western view-point entirely, most of them will inevitably have that view-point. Even if they are Eastern by blood, they will grow up out of touch with the traditions and attitudes of their ancestors. If (as is actually the case in India) the foreign education is generally imperfect and second-rate, they will become half-baked unsuccessful Westerners. But a half-baked Occidental is not an Oriental—a truism which is often overlooked.

Now no one is satisfied with the products of the regular Government and missionary colleges in India. The graduates seem mostly to be good for nothing except clerkships, or teaching positions in just such institutions; and there are not enough of these to go round. They are out of touch with the historic civilization of the country, and have nothing to contribute to its cultural life. It is not their fault; nothing else could

or should have been expected from such a system. If I could I should boldly abolish every Government and missionary school in India. I should prefer that Indian boys should attend the *pathashalas* of their own pandits. I respect those pandits highly. Their learning is circumscribed but it is deep, and also indigenous. It is better that young people should learn something—anything—though roughly, than that they should get a smattering of a large assortment of subjects; and it is better that they should know even a little of their own country's culture than a larger sum of facts comparatively unrelated to the life of their own people. But it would be still better if they could all attend schools like that founded and run by Rabindranath Tagore at Santiniketan. This great Indian and citizen of the world is one of the few who have seen clearly that if an Indian is to be a useful citizen of India, his education must be based on Indian civilization in the first instance. There is nothing narrow or chauvinistic in Tagore's programme: he adopts and uses all the applied science of the West. But he remains, and keeps his educational system, rooted in Indian life and culture. If he and his followers should affect in any profound way the educational life of India, they would refute Mr. Dickinson's thesis. For there is no greater living exponent than Tagore of that beauty, spirituality, and dignity in life which Dickinson admires in the historic background

of the Orient; and yet he has adopted almost every valuable feature of Western civilization.

My other point concerns the future of religion in India. Religion, as Mr. Dickinson says, has always been a living, dominant force in that country—Indian religion in the past has been, he says, peculiarly unworldly and impractical; the ideal life has involved withdrawal from the world; all sentient existence has been regarded as worthless and evil. To Indians the most admirable man is the "saint," who renounces life and seeks truth solely within himself. This attitude he finds directly antagonistic to that of science, which recognizes observation and experience as the only sources of true knowledge, and accepts normal human life as a worthy end in itself. India is religious and mystical, the West is scientific; and the two attitudes cannot possibly be reconciled. He is rather too sweeping here; even in the West there are still many eminent men of science who do not find these two ways of seeking truth so irreconcilable; who think that some kinds of truth can be found by "unscientific," mystical methods. But let that pass; broadly speaking there is much truth in this contrast, and for the sake of argument let us grant it.

It is still not clear to me that India, in adopting science, must necessarily renounce its religion. For one thing, our author exaggerates the universality of anti-worldliness in Indian religion in

the past. The *Bhagavad Gītā*, though thoroughly mystical, is nevertheless not anti-worldly. It strongly opposes withdrawal from the world; the "saint," by Dickinson's definition, is discountenanced in it. It enjoins man to remain in the world and do his duty in worldly activities. And no religious book has had greater influence or popularity in India.

Moreover, since Mr. Dickinson wrote there has arisen in India a pretty good living embodiment of the *Gītā*'s doctrine. If it is true that "the persistence of Indian religion . . . will depend on the continuous appearance of the "saint," then Indian religion may still persist while a man like Mahatma Gandhi lives. For he is accepted as a "saint"; the masses of India practically worship him. But his sainthood is not of the world-renouncing type; it follows rather the line of the *Gītā* (which by the way is his favourite religious authority). He is not anti-scientific; he accepts all of Western science so far as it seems to him to be demonstrated, which is all that science itself does or can demand. And certainly, he agrees with the West that at least some features of "worldly" life are highly important, and worth striving for. He is called a consummate politician, and in a very deep sense this is true; but if he is troublesome to his political opponents, this is perhaps just because he takes religion into politics, which is contrary to the rules of the game as played in the West. His idea of the good

life is fundamentally Indian. To be generally acceptable it may need some modification; he himself claims no final authority, no definitive revelation of truth. But the main point is that he is striving for a true blend of all that is of "practical" value in Western culture with his own inherited mysticism. In other words he, like Tagore, though in a quite

different way, is trying to disprove Mr. Dickinson's thesis that "civilization is a whole" and cannot be transferred by sections, with acceptance of some parts and rejection of others. It is doubtless too soon to predict either success or failure for his experiment. But no one will deny that he has a vast influence in his native land.

FRANKLIN EDGERTON

VICTORIAN AND POST-VICTORIAN*

[**Geoffrey West** contrasts the Victorian era of missions with the Georgian era of jobs, and incidentally he puts his finger on the real weak spot in D. H. Lawrence, who found occultism a reality but "antipathetic" to him. He recommended to Nancy Henry—"Try and get hold of Madame Blavatsky's books . . . get from some library or other *Isis Unveiled* and better still the Two Volumes work whose name I forget . . . they are not *very* much good" (p. 476). This was after the war which had killed the soul of Lawrence. Compare the failure of Lawrence with that of Wordsworth as described by Mr. Hugh I'A. Fausset in *THE ARYAN PATH* for October 1932. They make the teaching of *The Voice of the Silence* speak with a new emphasis—

"Do not believe that lust can ever be killed out if gratified or satiated, for this is an abomination inspired by Mara. It is by feeding vice that it expands and waxes strong, like to the worm that fattens on the blossom's heart."]

Is it possible to sum up a generation, to say nothing of a century, in a generalisation? Probably not, and yet one can, it is inevitable that one should, draw distinctions. More, they exist, they really are there, whether defined or not. The spirit of the age continually changes, and one is made aware of such change in a thousand ways. One reads perhaps of Gladstone receiving the news of his first call to Premiership. He

is cutting down a large tree in his garden, and for some moments he does not even pause. Then the blows cease, and, in the word so of an eye-witness, "Mr Gladstone, resting on the handle of his axe, looked up and with deep earnestness in his voice and with great intensity in his face exclaimed: 'My mission is to pacify Ireland.' He then resumed his task, and never said another word till the tree was down." A simple Victorian inc

* *The Great Victorians*. Edited by H. J. MASSINGHAM and HUGH MASSINGHAM. (Ivy Nicholson & Watson. 8s. 6d.)

The Letters of D. H. Lawrence. Edited with an Introduction by ALDOUS HUXLEY (Heinemann. 21s.)

ent, undoubtedly received by readers of that day with a sense of its unchallengeable fitness. And even we to-day, though the delayed pause, the earnestness, the intensity, the subsequent completion of the task in hand, are all so very much in character as to have a touch of caricature, can find it entirely appropriate. But what we do feel is that, were we to hear it reported to-day of a living politician, we shouldn't believe it, we should deem it smart publicity. "My *mission*!" What we lack to-day, that the Victorians so notably had, is exactly that sense of mission. They knew just where they wanted to go, and often (though never with Ireland) they got there with astonishing success. But we are at sea—socially, politically, morally, spiritually. A tree is a good thing to lay an axe to, but the sharpest blade will cut little ice on an ocean so restless, tossing, and uncharted as that whereon we are adrift. One can say: My mission is to reach the coast of Spain, or India. Or even the Golden Isles. But when the headsman at the bows tells us that his *mission* is to take soundings our instinct is to tell him to get on with his *job*. The instance and the metaphors are simple, nevertheless they point to some of the profoundest differences between nineteenth and twentieth centuries, at any rate in Europe.

Those who would study the Victorian mind, both as it was in itself and as it appears to a number of living writers, cannot

do better than turn to the pages of Messrs. Massinghams's bulky compilation, *The Great Victorians*, in which forty outstanding figures of that period are subjected to the scrutiny of forty varying intelligences of this. The selection of subjects may be disproportionate to the essential English achievements of the period—too many belong to literature and art, one-tenth only are specifically scientific; there are seven politicians, and only two religious leaders (Booth and Newman)—and the essays themselves are uneven in quality, though the general standard is high, yet the book achieves its end. Here are Victorians seen by moderns of every point of view and every possible phase of post-Victorian development. Really, however, to understand the consciousness which we may say to-day has superseded the Victorian, one might better turn to another book altogether, *The Letters of D. H. Lawrence*. Lawrence stands for many to-day in Britain and America—a portent, his very name a battle-cry—and, in a degree, rightly so. Even in our own time Lawrence has been abused without understanding, but Victorianism would certainly have stoned him out of hand, without a dissentient voice. Fortunately for him, perhaps, he was no more conceivable in than to the nineteenth century, for he is the incarnation of that new spiritual consciousness which has so completely shattered the shard of the Victorian mentality.

Every age has its consciousness, every consciousness is spiritual in its degree, and every spirit finds its form; but there are ages which stress the spirit, the inner being, and again ages to which the form, the outer being, is almost all. Form as such had perhaps its European apotheosis in the eighteenth century, but though the nineteenth, coloured a little by the spiritual perception of the early Romantic Movement, saw deeper, was more essentially serious, still it too gave precedence to Law before Spirit, held a discipline more formal than organic, valued the letter above the life. Even on the highest level it exalted the intellect, sheer reason, above the deepest knowledge of the soul. Few men more essentially shaped the Victorian mentality than Charles Darwin with his mechanist picture of nature; his intellectual offspring were Herbert Spencer, Huxley, Thomas Hardy, each of whom in his own way proclaimed a universe sterilized by the scientific vision. Beside them, the "sweetness and light" of Matthew Arnold, the humanism of William Morris, the literary esotericisms of Rossetti, Swinburne, Stevenson, and the like were little more than ineffectual evasions. Science was writ large across the Victorian firmament, and the great majority of those who did not directly bow to it still made implicit acknowledgment of their consequent unimportance. (Only Samuel Butler was really unrepentant in his irrever-

ence.) The very Christian Churches, contesting the findings of science, interpreted their own doctrines (to the latter's discrediting!) with a scientific precision, almost to the degree of accepting evident parable as statement of fact. In every realm intellect established a goal that was never in doubt, the way to which lay plain to the vision. Thus the Victorians were narrow in their interests, bigoted in their general outlook; they ignored by-paths, the heights equally with the abysses. They would not admit their lapses even to the extent of confessing their sins; prudery, hypocrisy, were made automatic oubliettes down which to dispose of inevitable faults on the principle of least said, soonest mended. Convention was a power that ruthlessly crippled those who would not conform to it. Yet it was this very power of keeping to the path, to the point, that produced that effectiveness in action, force of concentration, and persistence which marks all their greatest figures—that ability to pursue a single scheme over decades of untiring effort which produced, for example, Spencer's "Synthetic Philosophy" and (even more notably) Darwin's *Origin of Species*.

Victorian discovery indisputably opened great vistas of time and space, but it viewed them only from one, the intellectual, standpoint. It was a limiting, finally an imprisoning, vision. What Poe called "the mad pride of intellectuality" reared about itself

cell spiritually as devoid of illumination as the deepest dungeons to be found in that same author's tales of horror. The spirit, if it was not to die, had to break those bonds. The modern consciousness seems at times simply dispersed, without shape or direction. It is in fact a released consciousness, seeking form yet fearing lest it find but another prison, desiring a plastic, organic form shaped from within, not without. It is a quest infinitely difficult, demanding a wisdom as wide as the world, as old as mankind itself, yet needing for the West a mode of definitism comprehensible to the West.

Here we touch the essential value of the life and work of D.H. Lawrence. He was one of "the *Grenzleute*"—"the border-line people"—"those who are on the verge of human understanding, and who widen the frontiers of human knowledge all the time—and the frontiers of life". As he said of another, one "reverences him the more according to the degree of purity of his genius, reverences him less according to the degree of his practicality". The tragedy of Lawrence was that his genius was less than pure. He once wrote of the artist Van Gogh that "if he could only have let the angel of himself clear in relation to the animal of himself, clear and distinct but always truly related, in harmony and union, he need not have cut his ear off and gone mad". How true not only of Van Gogh but of Lawrence! Those words were

written early in 1915, when, "The Rainbow" that extraordinary exploration of the psychical life of three English generations, was written but still unpublished, when, that is, Lawrence was still going forward in positive development. The book blazes, even to-day, with nascent life, although in its last pages one may find a trace of that oppressive quality which makes its successor and sequel, *Women in Love*, a deathly volume. Some deny that the War disrupted Lawrence, and it is certainly possible to discern in these books the seeds of the conflict that shattered him. But if his letters make anything plain it is the effect of the War in making recovery, victory over that conflict, impossible. Many of his pre-War and early-War letters are simply magnificent in their intuitive understanding of, their tactile sensitiveness to, life. But from 1916 to 1918 we find exacerbation rising steadily almost to madness—a madness in which it seems only accidental that he did not cut off *his* ear! Relief follows with peace, but he never becomes the same man again. The later letters are interesting, but the deep perception of the earlier is gone; there has been not inward growth but disintegration. He travelled ceaselessly because in no one place could he find the peace his soul no longer held. To the end he remained what he called himself in 1914, "a passionately religious man," his novels written "from the depth of my religious experience," but the harmony

between angel and animal, at best glimpsed rather than attained, was destroyed for ever—progressively he denied the angel and proclaimed the animal. He had glimpses still. There is to the end wisdom in his letters as in his works.

Of occultism generally he wrote to a friend in 1918 that it was certainly a reality, and "very interesting and important, though antipathetic to me," and a few months later he was referring another friend to the works of Madame Blavatsky, again with reservations. More and more as time went on he derided modern science because he did not feel its findings "within," and turned back to the old pre-Christian gods and knowledge :

The old dark religions understood. 'God enters from below,' said the Egyptians, and that's right. Why can't you darken your minds, and know that the great gods pulse in the dark, and enter you as darkness through the lower gates The god of gods is unknowable, unutterable, but all the more terrible; and from the unutterable god step forth the mysteries of our prompting in different mysterious forms : call it Thoth, or Hermes, or Bacchus, or Horus, or Apollo, different promptings, different mysterious forms. But why don't you leave off your old white festerings in silence, and let a light fall over your mind and heal you? And turn again to the dark gods, which are the dark promptings and passion-motions inside you, and have a reverence for life.

How perceptive—and how blind! What absolute stepping-forth from the tyranny, the limi-

tation, the psychical castration of Victorian certainty and intellectualism—what total lack of education in the wider wisdom he feels his way towards! One should perhaps, turn rather to such a book as his *Apocalypse* to find a statement of his creed :

What man most passionately wants is his living wholeness and his living unison, not his own isolate salvation of his "soul". Man wants his physical fulfilment first and foremost, since now, once and once only, he is in the flesh and potent. For man, the vast marvel is to be alive We ought to dance with rapture that we should be alive and in the flesh, and part of the living, incarnate cosmos. I am part of the sun as my eye is part of me. That I am part of the earth my feet know perfectly, and my blood is part of the sea What we want is to destroy our false, inorganic connections, and re-establish the living organic connections, with the cosmos, the sun and earth, with mankind and nation and family. Start with the sun, and the rest will slowly, slowly happen.

But even in *Apocalypse* he looked no further than the flesh and a fleshly knowledge of "the elemental immediacy of the cosmos".

The Victorians paid lip-service to the spirit, in terms that denied it; Lawrence has denied it after a fashion that, so long as he is read with understanding of his limitations, gives it release. He cannot suffice, else we do but exchange one prison for another. But where *they* denied, *he* points to, a wisdom larger than their or his own.

GEOFFREY WEST

TOWARDS THE UNIVERSAL RELIGION*

[D. L. Murray is one of those silent moulders of the thoughts of men whose labour cannot be valued by only a reading of his numerous books and articles. In this review once again he pleads for a brotherhood of religions.—EDS.]

In these lectures, originally delivered at Calcutta, the Professor of Theology in Yale University, gives us a singularly lucid and comprehensive survey of the religious problem as it presents itself to the modern consciousness. No doubt, the aim of the work is constructive rather than critical; but those who cannot at all points accept Prof. Macintosh's scheme for the reconstruction of traditional theology in the form of a universal religion can at any rate admire and profit by his survey of the chief religious philosophies of the day.

After a brief criticism of the inadequacy of traditional religion regarded as a scheme of doctrines and values imposed by an authority not subject to rational examination, the author attacks the problem of the possibility of religious knowledge, and shows the unsatisfactoriness of the "empiricism" that would reduce human knowing to a mere flux of sensations and the agnosticism that admits the existence of an Absolute Reality but denies that any knowledge of its nature is possible. In the hands of Kant, however, agnosticism is made to yield a gleam of hope, for if we cannot know "things in themselves" we are yet able in virtue of our sense of moral obligation to postulate

the necessary existence of God, free will and immortality as an act of the practical reason.

This leads us on to the enchanted land of Hegelianism or Absolute Idealism, where Prof. Macintosh lingers for a good many pages fascinated, as any religious mind must be, by the majesty and harmony of the great vision evoked by Hegel and his successors, Green, Bradley, Bosanquet, the Cairds and Royce, the vision of the Universe as the thought of a single Absolute Mind of which all finite minds are somehow part, a Mind for which error and evil can be known merely as appearances, partial points of view transcended in the knowledge of the Whole which is rational throughout. One may fairly assume that the grand vision of Hegel, like the vision of Plato and the vision of Spinoza, is one that will draw to itself disciples so long as human beings philosophize; like all the greater philosophic intuitions it resists criticism in virtue of its sheer sweep and magnificence. Those who have once yielded to the spell are resigned to leave certain fundamental puzzles unsolved; they had rather admit a certain number of impenetrable riddles than abandon an interpretation of the universe so luminous and

* *The Pilgrimage of Faith in the World of Modern Thought.* Stephanos Nirmalendu Lectures. By DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH. (University of Calcutta)

comprehensive. They feel too the relief, after so many troubled arguments for and against the existence of God on the grounds of science, history, and metaphysics, of reposing in the iron dialectic that offers to show the impossibility of making the simplest statement without implicitly admitting the existence of an absolute and all comprehensive spiritual Reality. For this philosophy God is truly all and in all. The oppositions of matter and spirit, subject and object are overcome; evil is subsumed in a higher Good, the Real is rational through and through, and the rational is the absolutely Real. There is no need to search out God or risk of losing Him, for it is impossible ever to escape from His Being. He is in every thought and every act, as the French poet has said: *Quelque chose en moi que soit plus moi-même que moi.* Prof. Macintosh's restatement of the Hegelian position, critical as it is, is so able and clear that it brings back all the fascination of that proud phase in German and British philosophy; and when he bids us pass on to views that he thinks give a better account of the ultimate problems of God and man we do so reluctantly, wondering whether, after all, we shall not be merely exchanging one set of difficulties for another, and whether we should not, like St. Peter on the Mount of Transfiguration, set up our tents here rather than seek possible disillusionment elsewhere.

Still, we cannot afford to dis-

regard such pungent criticisms of Absolute Idealism as Prof. Macintosh enforces. Can the Ultimate Reality of the Universe be Thought and nothing else? Not the struggle against moral evil deprived of its meaning if evil is already "somehow" overcome in the Absolute? What genuine freedom has the human will, what genuine reality have individual personalities if they are merely "moments" or "aspects" in the unfolding of a universal, irresistible Reason? Graves the difficulty of all. Is there any meaning whatever in saying that human minds can be "included" in an Absolute Mind? Would not the very inclusion obliterate their individual characteristics?

"How can one of my experiences of ignorance or error, for example, be in and for a perfectly rational, all-comprehending and therefore all-knowing Absolute Mind exactly what is for me? In the Absolute my ignorance or error would be accompanied by knowledge of that of which I am ignorant. But is it not psychologically inconceivable that contents of experience can be in full consciousness in the same rational mind with other relevant contents without being in the least modified by that fact? The Absolute's omniscience would make error no longer error and ignorance no longer ignorance so that these contents of experience could not be in the Absolute as they are in us."

Dr. Macintosh goes on to quote the gibe of a well-known pragmatist that if the Absolute really include the multiplicity of human Minds with their errors, fantasies and incoherences, it must be regarded as "morbidly dissociated, or even as down right mad". There is, however, surely another possibility to be taken into account. The Absolute may be not "morbidly" but "functionally" dissociated. In the human organism a great many necessary actions are performed "automatically" or "unconsciously"—that is, it seems most reasonable to suppose, performed under the direction of conscious processes immanent in the organism which do not emerge into the central cerebral consciousness, which they would overcrowd and confuse by their presence. May not the Absolute Mind similarly have shut off from Itself the finite centres of consciousness to deal with particular problems—the unity of the whole subsisting at a deeper level than that of the functionally separated conscious parts?

However this may be, Prof. Macintosh leads us into fresh fields in the pursuit of his aims, and proceeds next to examine the philosophy of Pragmatism, or the doctrine that theories are to be tested by their working, by the practical help they give in organizing and harmonizing our experiences. This seems to us the least satisfying part of his book. It is not possible to give any adequate account of the Pragma-

tic movement without keeping William James and F. C. S. Schiller in the foreground, but Prof. Macintosh only treats of the former very casually, and practically ignores the latter altogether. He concentrates exclusively upon Prof. John Dewey and his school; but, distinguished figure as Dewey must always remain, he cannot give the law to Pragmatism. If members of his school pragmatically evaluate the idea of "God" as merely a symbol of human and social values, they can only speak for a wing of the movement; neither James nor Schiller have so eviscerated the idea of God's existence. Still, Pragmatists, as a body, should not complain of Prof. Macintosh, since he avowedly accepts their central doctrine of the "Will" "(or "Right") to Believe", under due safeguards and without ignoring the controlling power of objective reality in testing the postulates of the religious consciousness. The principle of "Moral optimism" upon which Prof. Macintosh builds much of his own creed is just such a "Postulate," affirming on the basis of our sense of moral values that "the cosmos, ultimately considered, must be on the side of the spiritual. In other words, the God we imperatively need exists".

In his synthesis of modern modes of thought Prof. Macintosh seems to us to make a better use of Pragmatism than he does of the so-called New Realism, from which also he tries to draw elements for his construction.

Timeo Danaos From Berkeley to Hegel and Bradley the Idealistic argument that the existence of matter independently of mind is inconceivable has been one of the most cogent arguments for a spiritual interpretation of the Universe. Prof. Macintosh's revival of the old distinction between secondary and primary qualities of matter, as a basis for asserting the independent existence of the latter, apart from the perceiving subject does not carry more conviction to us than Locke's statement of the same case centuries ago. Nor are we clear in what sense Prof. Macintosh holds himself to have established a direct experience or intuition of the Deity comparable to the direct experience of material objects. The Idealistic inference from matter to mind still seems to us a much stronger argument, and Prof. Macintosh's ultimate Theism is far more firmly based on the modified doctrine of creative evolution which he adapts from Bergson than on the contribution of the New Realism. (It is a misfortune that his lectures went to Press before he could utilize Prof. Bergson's latest book *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion*.)

The last chapter should be of special interest to Theosophists since it contains suggestions for an attitude towards the historic

religions which should allow those who have been brought up in particular faiths to remain loyal to the special revelations of the Divine Nature contained in them while at the same time uniting with adherents of other creeds in acknowledging the universal religious values which hold good for all humanity. This is an ideal that has for a long while appealed to the present writer. In a Catholic cathedral we see united in a whole the symbols of a number of different aspects of the Divine Reality. The High Altar stands for the Unity of the Godhead, and round it are grouped chapels and shrines dedicated to the Blessed Sacrament, the Madonna, the Sacred Heart of Jesus and a number of Saints. Why should there not arise some day a vaster cathedral in which the chief religions of the world, Judaism, Christianity, the Hindu and Buddhist faiths, Moslemism, should each have their appropriate shrine under a roof that symbolized the embracing unity of the Universal religion. Such a vision perhaps outruns the caution of Prof. Macintosh's well-weighed thought, but it is not out of consonance with the spirit of his book. If he has not defined the whole faith of future humanity, he has made the advance of a bold and a skilled pioneer.

D. L. MURRAY

THE MIND OF YOUTH

[In almost every country the young are dissecting the ways and outlooks of their elders. Meantime two well-known publicists take stock of the capacity of the modern youth in the following reviews.—EDS.]

I*

Why is Youth so vocal to-day? It has its say on every subject and nobody objects. The reason is the Age is silent. The void has to be filled. There is a pretence that we must listen to Youth; but it is only pretence, which it would be better to give up. What the age wants is wisdom, and wisdom comes only when youth is ended.

I approached this book, therefore, without expecting that it would contain guidance for the world, or even for the Youth of the world. I was not mistaken. There are five essays by young men and two by young women, in which the writers say what they think about religion. Two of them are Roman Catholics, one is an Anglo-Catholic, the other four have no professed religion. They all say what we should expect. The Churchmen expound their beliefs, the others explain their uncertainties. They all write modestly and without self-assertion. For those reasons the book has a certain charm. The writers are sincere and sincerity must be acknowledged.

Let me summarise what they say, as far as possible in their own words.

Susan Lowndes, whose father is a well-known London journalist and her mother a popular novelist, says:

I am a Catholic because I had the good fortune to be born into the Church, and the good sense to remain in it; and I remain a Catholic because I prefer to have a philosophy of life which is based on reason, and not one that is based on sentiment or vague humanitarianism.

Peter Winckworth takes an interest in politics and is articulated to a solicitor; he says:

The worship of God, the worship of the Mass, the practice of religion, are joyful, and they alone can satisfy the soul.

Christopher Casson, a young actor, says:

I am . . . an Anglo-Catholic. The Catholic form of worship is the same all the world over . . . But as an Anglican I can remain tolerant, I can remain free to think for myself, and to develop my mind and life, with a tradition behind me, and yet without fetters. And that, I think, is what I need.

Pamela Frankau, clever novelist, daughter of a clever novelist father, says:

I am in a pretty good muddle about everything . . . Christianity . . . is, literally, too much of a good thing.

So she comes to this:

The accepting of a moral code, an instinctive reverence for the Bible, the Church and the name of God—together with the gravest doubts of their significance.

E. L. B. Hawkin, whose mother is sister of the late General Louis Botha, works in a City office, says:

I felt compelled to throw over my allegiance to organized religion some years ago . . . I have tried to form a personal philosophy which carries me along very well. . . I believe in moderation and a sense of balance in all ways. I believe that it pays to be honest. . . I believe that a sense of humour is vitally important. . . I believe in never worrying until it happens. . . If I worship any God, it can best be expressed in one word—"Genuineness".

Giles Playfair, the actor son of a famous actor father, asks for:

. . . a new Church suitable to modern conditions, a Church that appeals to energy and not to self-content, a Church unhampered by puritanical misgivings and Victorian traditions, a Church that may encourage and assist in all that the nation is striving for.

W. A. Fearnley-Whittingstall, who is a rising young barrister with political interests, says:

Religion attracts . . . because all courage attracts. . . Religion demands courage and ideals. The Church does not repel but it disappoints.

The two Roman Catholics are positive, they have no doubts, they are educated in their faith. Miss Lowndes writes the best essay in the book, the clearest, the one that says most. The

Anglo-Catholic is nothing like so positive. He says, "My beliefs are far from static," and he writes of "... such ideas as I have tried to think out for myself". He is thoughtful and earnest, but he obviously has not gone very deep. The essays of the four non-believers are not on the same intellectual level as the others. Miss Frankau is superficial and confused; Mr. Hawkin has the every day philosophy of the business man; Mr. Playfair does not know what to think; and Mr. Fearnley Whittingstall, as a careful lawyer, refuses to commit himself.

What can we get from this book? That Youth is eager for religion and that outside the Church it has found no satisfaction. That is a remarkable fact.

Does it mean that Youth must return to Church? If so, I think the future to be hopeless; for if there is one thing those who are outside the Church are unanimous about is that they will never go inside. So what is to be done? Those who can guide Youth must go where Youth is to lead it. Are there such guides? Ah, I have no doubt of that; but they are not at present guiding. Youth waits for them to lead it out of the age of Chaos.

Until the guides begin to lead what can Youth do? I shall be asked. Young men and women can start on the path for themselves. The first step is to be trustful, and the second to trust yourself, or to have courage. Those who take those steps can never go wrong.

C. B. PURDUM

II*

This is a first book, and the publisher tells us that the author is aged 21—a fact which the reader who has the misfortune to be twice his age has constantly to bear in mind. For Mr. Hale's work has certain of the essential qualities of youth. He is excited; he finds the universe and its problems tremendously important, and his sense of the urgency of the issues with which he deals often causes him to over-write. Consequently his language, eloquent and exceedingly expressive at times, loses much of its effect by keeping the reader at a perpetual strain. But Mr. Hale has something to say, and the reader who allows himself to be put off by the exceptionally strained atmosphere of the earlier pages will be making a mistake.

The "challenge to defeat" which Mr. Hale sets out to answer is the challenge presented in Spengler's *Decline of the West*. He regards Spengler as the spiritual descendant and at the same time in the last resort the antithesis of Goethe. He takes Spengler's vast generalisations and his marshalling of selected facts in support of a hypothesis which depends

ultimately upon instinct and not on reason very seriously indeed, and a large part of his book is spent in the statement and rebutting of Spengler's fundamental contention. For a reader who is quite unable to take Spengler seriously this puts some obstacles in the way of an appreciation of Mr. Hale's thesis. But the thesis itself is none the less important. In Mr. Hale's view the world alike in art and science and in its way of life stands at a turning-point. The nineteenth century, or rather the period that ended with the Great War, was essentially a period of the dissolution of values of the disappearance of that 'totality' which is the key to the understanding of truth. During this century science, pursuing its path of material discovery, forgot subjectivity in its more and more intensive study of objective phenomena, while art, pursuing ever more intensively the paths of introspection, forgot objectivity in a development which has ended to-day in a purely barren individualism, or sometimes in a furious and unreasoning reversion to the primitive. In way of life, too, the nineteenth century forgot

* *Challenge to Defeat—Modern Man in Goethe's World and Spengler's Century.* By WILLIAM HARLAN HALE. (Harcourt Brace and Company, New York.)

the totality of things in the pursuit of individualism and ended up in an unworkable and rapidly dissolving chaos of *laissez faire*. The mark of the new age, Mr. Hale believes, will be the return from this individualism to a spirit of community—totality—in life, art and science. The scientists, having analysed matter until it has dissolved under their touch, will have to seek a reintegration with the subjective fact of life which they have hitherto ignored. The artists will have to come out of their introspection into a world of objective reality based on the community of men, and the way of living will have to be reorganised so as to discard the individualist motives of capitalist society in favour of a communal effort for the achievement of the good life. All this, Mr. Hale believes, is coming about, though we cannot see

it clearly because a thing can be seen clearly only when it has happened and not while it is happening. He states his thesis and adorns it with the fruits of a reading and study astonishingly abundant in one of his years. If this is not in the fullest sense a good book, it is at any rate a very interesting and promising book. For more than any other which I have read it does express that turning away of the mind of youth from the weariness and disillusionment of the immediate post-war years to the attempt to find a fresh constructive synthesis of self with the outside world—a new subject-object relation keenly enough realised to give man back his self-confidence and his sense both of the reality of things outside himself and of the worthwhileness of purposeful endeavour.

G. D. H. COLE

Nogaku, Japanese Nō Plays. By BEATRICE LANE SUZUKI (John Murray, London. 3s. 6d.)

Mrs. Beatrice Lane Suzuki does not attempt an exhaustive study of the Japanese Nō plays. It would be an impossible task within the compass of the well-known *Wisdom of the East* series. Such plays faithfully reflect the spirit of the Japanese people from early dance, legend, Shinto worship to Buddhism, and such aesthetic refinement as the ability to taste the colour and perfume of a flower. Much might be written on such apparently simple expletives as "Ha" and "Ho," the movement of the sleeve, fan, foot, the strange significance of masks, the amazing impersonation of women characters by male actors. The detail is endless, intricate, hard to understand, but always of vital importance from a Japanese point of view. Every drum tap, every flute note, every inflexion of voice, every movement is contributory to the whole. No foreigner can

expect to appreciate this particular form of drama with any completeness. Much must remain incomprehensible. "He can," writes Mrs. Suzuki, "only grasp a bit of its fleeting charm and attempt to give a glimpse of it to others". That is precisely what Mrs. Suzuki has succeeded in doing, and doing exceedingly well, in this book. She provides a useful key in explaining *Yūgen*, "the identification of thought and action". Seami described it as "the actor's flower," without which there could be no beauty in the play. Such a performance is not to be approached lightly. It is capable of giving much, but only to those whose mind and spirit are sufficiently attuned to what is seen and heard upon the stage; devotees rather than patrons who must forget the theatre, the leading actor, even the idea or spirit of the play if they would comprehend Nō. It is a solemn rite and not theatre-going as we understand it.

HADLAND DAVIS

THE MYSTIC ANDREWS AND THE RATIONALIST JOAD

What I Owe to Christ. By C. F. ANDREWS. (Hodder and Stoughton, London. 5s.)

Under The Fifth Rib: A Belligerent Autobiography. By C. E. M. JOAD. (Faber & Faber, London. 10s. 6d.)

Modern religious literature abounds in works about religion. But one rarely finds a book which *is* religion. Such a book is C. F. Andrews' *What I Owe to Christ*. This is, in fact, an autobiography, chiefly spiritual. The author narrates here with candour, yet with modesty, the beginnings and growth of his spiritual experience, which is as real to him,—if not more real,—as the events of his physical life. In an attractive manner the book's nineteen chapters deal with the way in which "Christ's power to heal and restore has changed the whole aspect of things, integrating character," giving new hope and urging forward to nobler action. It is a practical "plea for a return, in spirit and in truth, to that pure love of Christ". It is a moving story of the pilgrimage of a God-thirsty soul and the notable incidents in this eventful life is told with striking simplicity and literary grace.

All through the volume there occur insights into the spiritual experiences of many of the most interesting people now living,—students, Moslems, Hindus, Confucians, Buddhists, Jews and Christians of many lands and races. Such sharing of religious experiences led to the inevitable break, conscious and deliberate, with the conventionalities of Christianity which hitherto bound him hand and foot and made it impossible for him to grow to the fulness of his spiritual personality. This shaking off of authority and dogma has enabled the author to demonstrate with unconscious grace and utter freedom from cant the possibility of being, in the Pauline sense, all things to all men, and show how broad Christianity can be without losing its depth; how utterly much of the divisiveness of organized Church life denies the spirit of the Master; how much more convincing loving friendli-

ness and faultless living are than argument: in short, how much more acceptable in form, richer in spirit and fuller in content the Christian religion can become if it is truly orientalized. Indeed, the author's way of life, as described in this book, is really a challenge which Western Christianity can ill afford to ignore without a considerable loss in her spiritual strength and usefulness.

Much as Mr. Andrews' book aims at freedom from the spirit of controversy, Prof. Joad's volume *Under the Fifth Rib: A Belligerent Autobiography*, seems to aim at arousing controversy and as much thought as controversy may engender. This author's book, much like that of C. F. Andrews, is unusual as an autobiography. In fact, it is no autobiography at all; if it is that it is in the sense of being "a series of personal grumbles". He makes fun of conventional morals and hey of conventional religion; he holds conventional politics to shame and classical education to ridicule, and thus gives us in this book an account of his own reactions to certain intellectual characteristics of his age which help the reader to understand the author's critical attitude to the whole field of life,—philosophy, politics, society, sex, literature, art and all the pleasures of the mind and the body. Being convinced that a distinguishing feature of the present age is the cult of unreason,—which is inimical to the progress of mankind,—he directs a merciless onslaught against some of its concrete expressions, such as, unreason in modern psychology, unreason in politics, unreason in literature, unreason in the use of science, unreason in religion and politics. Hence a belligerent autobiography.

The pages of Mr. Joad's book thus come to be invested with a certain gloom; something or other is always put up as object of contempt. The book may therefore produce in the mind of the reader the impression that the author is a disgruntled person, out of touch with the trends and movements of the time, and impotently grumbling at a society in

which he has failed. But nothing can be further from the truth; a careful reading will reveal that the author is a philosopher and as such he seeks to understand the nature of the universe as a whole and the meaning and purpose underlying it. He looks for a clue to guide him through the labyrinth, for a system wherewith to classify, or a purpose in terms of which to make it meaningful. It is difficult to concede the purpose without feeling some obligation to further it. It is difficult to conclude that human life is designed without concluding also that society, as we know it, is not realizing the design; difficult to believe that the object of evolution is the achievement of truth, goodness and beauty, and not lament the ever rising tide of ugly industrialism. Our author, must be pointed out to his credit, succeeds not only in discerning a purpose and recognizing an ideal but, unlike most of our modern philosophers feels an obligation to further the purpose or remove obvious impediments to the realization of the ideal. Driven by this sense of social duty and the conviction of the efficacy of Reason he has become so unflinching, pungent and satirical a critic of modern society.

It is interesting to note how the mystic Andrews and the rationalist Joad, though so different in so many ways, possess a similarity of aim in life,—service to fellowmen. While to Andrews faith is a faculty of mind transcending, not over-riding, reason in the apprehension of religious truth, to Joad faith is the power of believing what we now to be untrue" and reason "the power of kidding ourselves into believing what we think true is true". In this age of unreason, man's reason, he says, follows

his likings as the feet of a hungry dog follows its nose. Nevertheless, we must struggle, he maintains, to be wise, since we are free, within limits, to make our lives what we will.

Self is a little pit of vanity and desire from which it is our duty, as far as possible, to avert our eyes. Hence he praises not self-knowledge, as did the Greeks, but self-forgetfulness. Happiness, he points out, results not from pre-occupation with oneself but from oblivion of oneself in concentration upon some external thing. It comes as bye-product of one's efforts to better society. This way of looking at life naturally raises the question whether a life dominated by the spirit of religion and a life controlled and guided only by reason need be poles asunder. To this a careful and sympathetic reading of these stimulating autobiographies leads one to reply in the negative, for, the one appears as divinely human as the other is humanly divine. These two views of life possess too much in common to be antagonistic to each other. Prof. Joad, like Mr. Andrews, seeks for harmony and unity and refuses to take a departmental view of life. Both of them find their happiness largely in their efforts to remove social maladjustment and improve human relationship. While Mr. Andrews seeks to serve humanity through religious inspiration, Prof. Joad comes to the ideal of service to fellowmen by way of rational persuasion. Though there are points in which a reader may violently differ with the authors, yet one cannot but acknowledge that they have given us two thought-provoking volumes which are as unusual as they are interesting and deserve to be widely read.

JAGADISAN M. KUMARAPPA

As I See Religion. By H. E. FOSDICK. (Harper & Bros., New York, 1932.)

This is a very stimulating book, for all who are baffled by the challenge of modern scientific thought. The most systematic treatment of the subject of modern challenge to religion is perhaps to be found in Professor Radhakrishnan's "An Idealist View of Life". Dr.

Fosdick's book is less comprehensive and philosophical, but on that very account more vigorous and practical. It clearly points out that the Christian Churches in America ought not to wrangle over outworn creeds and dogmas. They ought not to worry about saving this or that brand of theology. A living and vigorous religion saves us.

We do not save it. The Christians of the first century did not go about saving Christianity. They went about saving souls. It is only when a movement grows senile that it begins to apologise for its existence.

We are glad to observe that progressive Christian writers have begun to realise what higher Hinduism has always taught that religion is primarily a matter of spiritual experience. What the churches have to do is to revitalize religion at its source, make it a stream of living water and not a stagnant pool with cement steps. They should dwell more on experience than on authority, insist more on spiritual life than on doctrinal belief and thus make religion an expansive force rather than a contractive one. We are sure that if preachers of all religions do this we shall soon have friendly contacts established between the various religious groups of the world which may go a great way in promoting world-peace and world-unity.

Dr. Fosdick's criticism of modern attempts at achieving a religion without God and a morality without religion is particularly opportune. He points out that non-theistic humanism of to-day is only a half-way house. It is right so far as it is humanism and looks upon human personality as something precious, but it is wrong when it plumes itself on being nontheistic and thinks that human personality can flourish without roots in God. Humanists, like all theists, want to cultivate the good life, but, unlike the theists, they try to cultivate it in a godless universe of their own, or of their friends'—the scientists'—imagining. The modern scientific view of the universe may be right so far as it goes. But obviously it is a partial view inasmuch as it does not give us the whole truth. It may be that the universe, as Sir James Jeans tells us, is an empty, finite, expanding, corrugated continuum of four dimensions—three of space and one of time. But to say that this is the whole truth about the universe is like saying that the whole of Shakespeare's *King Lear* is comprised within the twenty-six

letters of the English alphabet. If there are protons and electrons in the universe, there are also beauty and goodness. The world we live in is both quantitative and qualitative. To measure the quantities and ignore the values is only to take a deliberately false view. And it is precisely on this false view that modern humanism bases its philosophy. It takes for granted that man is "an accidental ripple inadvertently blown up on the cosmic surface". No wonder therefore its philosophy is so thin and dry. If man is nothing more than this, then all his attempts at living the good life are nothing more than the whistling of a cow-boy to keep up his courage in the dark. But religion takes quite a different view of man. It looks upon him, in Dr. Fosdick's language "as a spiritual adventurer in a spiritual world where all the best in him is responsive to the Eternal Best".

One of the modern heresies that Dr. Fosdick exposes in his brilliant book is that morals can flourish without religion. We often hear it said that atheists and agnostics are as moral as those who believe in religion. Well, first of all we do not know how many of those who pride themselves on their scepticism would be as moral as they are if they were not originally brought up in religious home and a religious society. And then morality is something higher than one's response to the ordinary decencies of life, ingrained social habits and personal affections. No great moral adventure, no martyrdom and no resurrection from a moral grave can ever be the result of a morality divorced from religious faith. Dr. Fosdick rightly points out that a man's morals may not suffer when he loses faith, but his *morale* does and he will soon cease to be a creative moral agent. When you lay the axe at the root of your tree your flowers may continue to laugh a while, but you will have no more flowers. Nor is it wisdom on your part to pluck your flowers and plant them in the ground to get more flowers. If you want the flowers you must cultivate the tree.

D. S. SARMA

Empty Victory. By GEORGE GODWIN. (John Long Ltd. 7s. 6d.)

The expectation of a golden age of peace and happiness is common to all faiths. In *Shantiparva* of the *Mahabharat* we find the philosophic conception of Krita Yuga. That golden age will come when the world will be full of perfect men with Ahimsa, self-knowledge and good will to all beings. All human action will then be free from the taint of selfishness (*Mahabharat, Shantiparva* 348: 62-63). Efforts of common people will, no doubt, help advent of that age. But the final touch will, it is believed, be given by the divine hand of an *Avatar*.

In modern thinkers that old remote hope has become more definite in form and more potent in its urge to present common effort. The golden age of modern thinkers is to come through a unifying world-state eliminating national and racial animosities, wars, armaments inequalities of wealth, etc. The ideal destination of human kind has become clearer in outline and detail by near approach. The way, however, is not yet clear. Amongst the many difficulties and dangers that beset the way the problem of disarmament is perhaps the toughest. And curiously enough exactly like the ancient mind the modern mind too seems to expect help from super-physical forces, acting through supermen.

What the ancient world put forth in its *Bhavishya Purana*, the modern world will express in Utopian novels. The inherent ideal and hope are the same.

George Godwin in his novel selects the most puzzling problem—the vicious circle of armaments and wars. In 1951 the unprovoked attack of France on England with the new “arsenic gas” destroyed all life in London in a few hours. The English king who fortunately escaped was taken captive to Paris. England was governed by the French army of occupation.

But England did not retaliate even though she could have. She was in-

spired by her saintly prime minister James Grant—a man who for the first time after centuries took the true Christian faith seriously, and with an undaunted firmness put it into action. The demonstration of the ultimate success of the policy of non-resistance on a national scale in face of an unprovoked invasion with all the novel means of scientific destruction, brought out a change in the world which any number of Peace Conferences would not have achieved. The evil unresisted, reacted on the evil doer. France was condemned by world opinion and economically boycotted by all nations. Her economic fabric shattered by a disastrous colonial war in the North African deserts, where the arsenic gas proved futile against the guerrilla warfare of the rebels. In order to save herself France has to take her hands off England unconditionally without England so much as raising a finger in opposition.

Fortified by this ultimate victory, James Grant inspires the nations in the League to effect general disarmament, which prepares the way for the establishment of a world-state. There is, of course, the usual love story tacked on to the texture of the international plot of the novel. The hero is an English youth fired with the ideals of the new age and the heroine a daughter of the old order is ultimately converted to the new faith. Their story gives us an idea of the impact on individuals of the changes which came over the world. But the couple pales in significance before the simple grandeur of the character of England's saintly premier. One can hardly think that either unique situation or its sequel would come so soon as 1951. But those who believe that the bright future of mankind will come through the real understanding of true religion and not by the destruction of all religion will welcome the novel. It prepares the popular mind for the reception of some of the ideas that will be the inevitable precursors of the Golden age.

G. V. KETKAR

A New Deal. By STUART CHASE. (Macmillan. 10s.)

I should call Mr. Stuart Chase an imaginative Communist. He accepts the communist ideal. He sees, with complete clarity, that the modern technique of industrial production is irreconcilable with economic individualism. The unhampered pursuit of private profit, which in one form or another is the motive of modern industrial society, stultifies and disrupts the proper functioning of the industrial machine. The contradiction, if unmitigated, will inevitably produce chaos. Somehow it must be removed. That is the economic doctrine of communism. Mr. Chase is also a communist though rightly he lays less stress on this in the simple ethical sense. He believes that the "capitalistic" system is unjust and ignoble as well as absurd and dangerous.

Since Mr. Chase is also imaginative enough to be a realist, he asks himself whether the Russian method of making the necessary change in society by violent revolution is possible in an already highly industrialised country, like the U. S. A., which now exists in a condition of what he calls "technological tenuousness": that is to say, a condition in which the vital economic connections are delicate and sensitive, so that revolutionary action, unless it were secured beforehand of the willing co-operation of the great majority of indispensable technicians, would lead to paralysis, privation and pestilence. Mr. Chase's answer to the question is implicit in his formulation of it. He does not believe that the application of the Russian method to an already highly industrialised country is feasible. Neither do I. It is possible only in an economically primitive country such as Russia was in 1917, where the economic organism is so rudimentary that it could survive the revolutionary shock without paralysis.

Russia staged her revolution in what was practically a handicraft society; the mass of the people, being still peasants, could eat. The thought of what would happen here, in a specialized and industrial society blanches the heart.

The question then, for Mr. Chase be-

comes one of the road by which we may advance to the revolutionary change. He frankly admits that, if the "capitalistic" system persists in its present blindness, violent revolution may be the only remedy; nor, in that case, will it be worse than the disease, because unmitigated economic individualism will inevitably produce its own chaos. The chaos of violent revolution will be preferable to that. It will at least be chaos pregnant with a hope and a purpose.

But can we advance to the revolutionary change without chaos? Mr. Chase believes we can. He will have nothing to do with the remedy that begins to allure Big Business the mere expansion of purchasing power among the poor who do consume. The final objective of the dictatorship of Big Business, says Mr. Chase very justly, "would be a subservient, inarticulate, but reasonably prosperous mass of consumers and workers, catering to a small group of Olympian spenders". He rejects the notion vehemently. "It will probably abolish poverty but it will think *only in terms of profitable consumers and never in terms of human beings*. There are two main charges against that ambiguous arrangement known as capitalism: that it is economically inefficient, and that it is an ignoble way of life. Critics frequently confuse the two."

Mr. Chase does not confuse them: and he rejects the dictatorship of Big Business primarily on ethical grounds, though he sees also that the unity of interest among the competitive which such a system postulates is hardly conceivable.

There remains what he calls "The Third Road"—a non-violent transition to a genuine collectivism. It is "an attempt to dissolve capitalism with a minimum of governmental interference." The main methods proposed are (1) the redistribution of the national income by heavy taxation (2) a managed currency (3) a huge programme of public works. These proposals are eminently sane. The problem is to mobilise a sufficient body of public opinion behind

men, for all three proposals are, in relation to the appalling backwardness of popular opinion, revolutionary. And in popular opinion I include the opinion of men in such commanding positions as the present Governor of the Bank of England. Such men, by their helpless ignorance of the modern economic reality, are no better than well-meaning barbarians.

Here then is our practical modern problem, clearly seen and rightly formulated by Mr. Chase. Direct revolution is probably impossible. But peaceful and gradual revolution makes no such simple and "religious" appeal as simple communism. On the other hand, it is not possible for an imaginative and intelligent man in a highly industrial nation to be a simple communist. Where is the dynamic necessary to imaginative communism to be found? My own belief, or hope, is that it will be found, in England at least, in a purified élite of the working-class movement, flexible

and open-minded enough to attract the best elements intellectual and technical of the middle-class. Of such a movement the basic philosophy would be communist, in the Marxian sense. But it would be an imaginative Marxism, as indeed was the Marxism of Marx himself. Inspired by that mystical materialism, that sense of society as an organic and evolving whole, it would be strong enough to face its peculiar and complex problems realistically without any weakening of its fundamental conviction of the necessity of revolution, and of the inevitability of the coming of the (economically) classless society. To the eventual formation of such a movement, consisting as it must of an enlightened minority of devoted and selfless men, who have brought their awareness to the point of understanding and accepting the necessity of overcoming their own economic individualism, once for all, Mr. Stuart Chase has made a very noble contribution.

JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY

Freedom in the Modern World. By JOHN MACMURRAY. (Faber. 6s.)

The book is encouraging and significant. It is really a collection of B. B. C. Talks. That is the significant thing. Publicly, to a large audience, the problem of Freedom is discussed. And what kind of Freedom? The usual chat concerning externalities? Not at all! Real Freedom is the subject, inner Freedom, the unbinding of the soul, the untying of the bonds of unreality that hold our spirits down. It might be thought that such a subject could not possibly be popular enough to appeal to the large Western audience that listens into the radio. Yet it is so; and it proves that Westerners are beginning to suspect that the solution of their problems is to be found, not in any action of politicians nor in any league of nations, but in a league of their own impulses. Take a sentence such as this—"There is no real problem in our economic or financial situation itself. Poverty cannot be the effect of an increase of wealth; nor can bankruptcy

be the result of a surplus of goods. When such a situation as we are in produces problems of a magnitude that is scaring us out of our wits, then there is insanity about." Such sentences addressed to a popular audience symbolise the awakening that is taking place in the West.

And there is nothing in the least superficial in the exposition of this unacademic professor. His positions are fundamental. H. P. Blavatsky's description of faith as a quality endowed with a most potent creative power finds exact expression again in Dr. MacMurray's answer to his question why we are in this mess: "Because we have lost our faith, and when we lose faith we lose the power of action." Our only complaint we have to make with the author in this connection is that in discussing the conflict between religion and science, though he has thrown one facet of the problem into strong relief, showing how in practice religion and science do conflict, he fails to point out how between real Religion and science con-

flict cannot arise. Nevertheless his fundamental attitude is held courageously throughout. This is well illustrated by his dicta on morals. The man of pseudo-religion invariably gives himself away when discussing the moral life. But here without any mincing of words the author emphasises that to the religious man life is an art, and morality the result of personal Freedom and sub-

ordinate to the fundamental problem of obeying the Holy Ghost. This is a profitable book written by a born teacher. And those who can learn from him are by no means only simple and perhaps ignorant people. To all who understand the message of mysticism it should be strongly recommended. It will help them further in their daily life.

J. S. COLLIS

Schopenhauer. His Life and Philosophy. By HELEN ZIMMERN. (Allen and Unwin. 7s. 6d.)

Two things give special significance to Schopenhauer in our own day; (1) his theory of the mutual relations between the Will and the Intellect; and (2) that he was the first considerable European thinker to recognise that Indian philosophy constitutes a heritage that cannot be ignored in any attempt to reconstruct the human ideal. Moreover, himself, in his own measure, he absorbed and re-shaped Eastern thought, and in that respect must be considered to be a forerunner of all those now engaged in seeking the terms of a cultural rapprochement between the East and the West. In Schopenhauer's theory of the Will, the term is understood in the widest sense, and signifies an universal impulse characteristic of man and the lower animals as well as the whole range of inanimate nature. "In all instances where we find any spontaneous movements or any primal forces, we must regard the innermost essence as Will." It is, in short, the very principle of existence, and denotes not only purposeful activity but instincts and tendencies of any and every kind. Reason is not an attribute of the Will. It is only one of the instruments fashioned by the primal impulse in the course of its development, and the development is not governed by

any motive translatable into rational language. The affinities of such a doctrine with certain contemporary forms of anti-intellectualism are duly pointed out by the author.

In regard to Schopenhauer as an exponent of Indian thought, Mrs. Zimmermann observes that he was "a precursor of the fusion of the European spirit of experimental research with the Eastern genius for abstract speculation. To state this somewhat differently, he continued that transition of the European mind from a predominantly monotheistic to a pantheistic view of the Universe which began with Bruno, and of which the end is not yet". It might perhaps be more accurate to say an "immanentist" rather than a pantheistic view.

As an introduction to the study of Schopenhauer, this book seems admirable. German metaphysics are apt to be abstruse to the point of incomprehensibility, but in these pages the reader will find the ideas of at least one German master summarised with encouraging lucidity. Of equal interest with the philosophy are the life and character of the philosopher, to which Mrs. Zimmermann devotes the greater part of her book. At one period in his life, we are told, Schopenhauer invariably read ancient Vedic books before retiring; "he called them his Bible".

K. S. SHELANKAR

The Kathopanishad and the Gita. By Prof. D. S. SARMA. (M. R. Seshan, Madras. Re. 1.)

This volume contains the text of the *Kathopanishad*, together with an Eng-

lish translation, notes, and an introduction in which Professor Sarma develops the view that the *Upanishad* was one of the sources of the *Gita*. The work gives one the impression of having been done

in a scholarly fashion, though of course it could only be effectively criticised from this point of view by a person familiar with Sanskrit.

The Kathopanishad consists only of six short chapters, but it is rightly regarded as containing the very kernel of the Vedantic philosophy. What it teaches is the central mystery of the relation between the lesser and the greater selves, that mystery which is embodied in the great saying, *Tat Twam Asi*. So subtle is this doctrine that an understanding of it cannot be obtained by any exertion of the intellectual powers alone; it must be imparted directly by one who has already attained to illumination;

This Atman cannot be gained by the study of the Veda, nor by intellect, nor by much learning." "Taught by an inferior man He is not easily grasped, nor variously is He conceived. If He is taught by a man who has realised Him within himself, then there is no uncertainty. For He is inconceivable and subtler than the subtle." "Not by reasoning is this knowledge obtained. Only when it is imparted by another, O dearest, can it be easily grasped." And even these conditions are fulfilled the revelation would seem to be contingent upon an act of grace: "He whom the self chooses, by him is it gained."

If this were all the reader—and particularly the Western reader—would be impelled to protest that a religion based upon such an elusive order of truth is completely unable to meet the needs of the great mass of humanity. But it is necessary to bear in mind that the Upanishad is definitely intended for the advanced student of spiritual philosophy. Whereas the *Gita* is written primarily for the layman and deals with the earlier and more practical aspect of the problem of emancipation, the *Kathopanishad* is addressed rather to the individual who is nearer the end of the road: "The *Gita*," says Professor Sarma, "was a message delivered to the man of the

world, while the Upanishad was a message delivered to the recluse in the forest." For, as he points out in his most interesting introduction to the work, the Eastern thinker recognises two stages in the path towards emancipation, that of extraversion, called *Pravritti Marga* and that of introversion, called *Nivritti Marga*. The second is regarded, reasonably enough, as the higher. For by the fact of being born into the world a man's attention is directed outside himself, and only as the result of a great deal of thought and suffering does he come to perceive that it is the appearance of reality rather than reality itself.

But for all that it is not held that the person whose mind is turned outwards is in a state of complete illusion. As Professor Sarma is careful to insist, any activity which causes us to identify our own selves with the selves of others brings us into relation of the Real. But that relation cannot be realized in its fulness until we have also found the Real within by a mystical process of meditation. And what is finally attained to, it is to be noted, is a condition in which both asceticism and external activity are transcended; for the self which initiated them both has achieved unity with the "One Ruler," and thereby become emancipated: "Let a Brahman renounce learning and become as a child; and, after renouncing learning and a child-like mind, let him become an ascetic. And when he has made an end of the ascetic state as well as the non-ascetic state, he becomes a Brahman indeed." This last saying may well be pondered over by those Western thinkers who believe that the philosophy of the East teaches only a purely negative attitude. For its message is, not that activity in itself involves the soul in illusion, but that neither activity nor non-activity have any reality unless they are an expression of the One, rather than of the separated, Self.

LAWRENCE HYDE

CORRESPONDENCE

ORIGIN OF INDIAN CASTES

In the Introduction to his translation of the *Bhagavad Gita*, the late Mr. Charles Johnston makes some very interesting suggestions about the origins of Indian castes and Indian religion. He tells us that the four great castes were based on racial differences; that the Brahmans sprang from a white race that may have come into India by way of the Hindu Kush; the Kshatriyas from the red Rajputs, whose territory extended from the Indus to the Ganges; the Vaishyas from the yellow agricultural races, whose lands ran south of the Rajput territory; and the Shudras from the black, or near black, peoples, who occupied the whole of southern portion of the peninsula. Mr. Johnston writes:

The great struggle between kindred branches of the Rajput race recorded there (in the *Mahabharata*), permanently weakened that race, and eclipsed its glory, thus making room for the long dominance of the sacerdotal Brahmans. The growth of the Brahman power forms, as it were, a measure of the passage of ages in ancient India. In the archaic days of the first Upanishads, we find the sacred wisdom wholly in the hands of the Rajputs, the royal races, akin, as it would seem, to the ancient Egyptians and Chaldeans. Two of the Upanishads record the first initiation of a Brahman into that wisdom. The initiator, a princely Rajput, marks the occasion by declaring that this wisdom had never before been given to a Brahman, but in every region was the hereditary teaching of the Kshatriya, the warrior, alone.

Mr. Johnston goes on to discuss the contribution made by each of the four great castes (races) to the complex fabric of Indian religion. The Rajputs, he tells us :

had their ancient tradition, which is put forth in the greater Upanishads, and which held the twin doctrine of rebirth and liberation. This tradition.....was much later imparted to the Brahmans.

Of the Brahmans, Mr. Johnston says :

In Indra and Agni, they adored certain great cosmic principles, and the Vedic hymns record the ritual of their worship. They believed in the soul's immortality, but did not hold the teaching of rebirth until the Rajputs disclosed it to them. They conceived the souls of the dead as still present in earthly life, making a united life with the living members of the family, and bound to them by close ties of moral and psychical kinship. Every year they offered sacrifices to them.....This ancient ancestor-worship runs through the whole of Brahmanical law.

Of the Vaishyas, we are told :

The yellow race of central India held, and for the most part holds to-day, a somewhat similar belief (to that of the ancient Brahmans). To it is added a practical spiritualism, the priests being mediums, who obtain communications from the souls of the departed ancestors, in trances, and visions.

With regard to the Shudras, Mr. Johnston says :

The black races had their beliefs, but they were wilder and more elemental. Fierce and grimly destructive gods, symbolised from the darker and more menacing powers of nature....were propitiated in wild emotional rites. . . . The many-armed and fantastic Indian gods are, in all likelihood, the contribution of the darker races of the south to the common fund.

Deeply suggestive as they are, I believe that Mr. Johnston's views would be considered heterodox by most scholars; and it would be exceedingly interesting if some of your learned Indian readers would comment on them.

London

R. A. V. MORRIS

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"———ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

When India's great leader Gandhiji speaks on mystical and religious matters he very often strikes a true and Theosophical note. In his statements issued to the press on the subject of Hinduism and religion, castes and untouchability, he has expressed ideas which give the religious world at large some fundamentals to be observed in life. What are the Revealed Books or the Vedas or the Bible or the Koran, what Eternal Religion or Sanatana Dharma? He writes:

I claim myself to be a Sanatanist... For me, Sanatana Dharma is a vital faith, handed down from generations, belonging even to the prehistoric period and based upon the Vedas, and on the writings that followed them. . . . It would be only partially true to say that the Vedas are the four books which one finds in print. These books are themselves remnants of discourses left by unknown seers. Later generations added to these original treasures, according to their lights. There then arose a great and lofty-minded man, the composer of the Gita. He gave to the Hindu world a synthesis of the Hindu religion, at once deeply philosophical and yet easily to be understood by any unsophisticated seeker. . . . I have been seeking literally to live upto the teachings of that book. Whatever is contrary to its main theme, I reject as non-Hindu. It excludes no faith and no teacher. It gives me great joy to be able to say that I have studied the Bible, the Koran, the Zend Avesta and other scriptures of the

world with the same reverence that I have given to the Gita. This reverent reading has strengthened my faith in the Gita. . . . I take pride in calling myself a Hindu because I find the term broad enough not merely to tolerate, but to assimilate the teachings of prophets from all the four corners of the earth. . . According to the Sanatana Dharma taught by that venerable author, life does not consist in outward rites and ceremonies, but it consists in the uttermost inward purification and merging oneself body, soul and mind in the Divine Essence.

This is the position of the true Theosophist who lives by the inner religion of purity and wisdom, and while outwardly respecting every creed and faith belongs to none, as H. P. Blavatsky once said.

Very reminiscent are these words of Gandhiji of some other words of a great Indian not known to fame—Damodar K. Mavalankar, a loyal and devoted pupil and colleague of H. P. Blavatsky. More than 50 years ago, in May 1880, when he abjured his own Brahmanical caste, writing of Theosophy, he said:

Thus this study makes every man respect his religion the more. It furnishes to him a sight that can pierce through the dead letter and see clearly the spirit. He can read all his religious books between the lines. If we view all the religions in their popular sense,

they appear strongly antagonistic to each other in various details. None agrees with the other. And yet the representatives of these faiths say that the study of Theosophy explains to them all that has been said in their religion and makes them feel a greater respect for it. There must, therefore, be one common ground on which all the religious systems are built. And this ground, which lies at the bottom of all, is truth. There can be but one absolute truth, but different persons have different perceptions of that truth. And this truth is morality. If we separate the dogmas that cling to the principles set forth in any religion, we shall find that morality is preached in any and every one of them. By religion I do not mean all the minor sects that prevail to an innumerable extent all over the world, but the principal ones from which have sprung up these different sects . . . If I, therefore, wish to place my humble services at the disposal of the world, I must first begin by working for my country. And this I could not do by remaining in my caste. I found that instead of a love for his countrymen the observance of caste distinctions leads one to hate even his neighbour, because he happens to be of another caste. I could not bear this injustice. What fault is it of any one that he is born in a particular caste? I respect a man for his qualities and not for his birth. That is to say, that man is superior in my eyes, whose *inner* man has been developed or is in a state of development. . . . If it were not for this distinction [of castes] India would not have been so degraded. . . . If such is the case, why should we still stick to that custom which we now find not only impracticable but injurious? . . . If I were to observe outwardly what I did not really believe inwardly, I was practising hypocrisy . . . Theosophy had taught me that to enjoy peace of mind and self-respect, I must be honest, candid, peaceful and regard all men as equally my brothers, irrespective of caste, colour, race or creed. This, I see, is an essential part of religion.

As we are copying these words comes the *Peiping Chronicle* of 30th October containing an address by Panchan Lama, who is regarded as the spiritual head of Tibet. In the course of an address delivered at a press reception he is reported to have said:

Why was China in such a chaos to-day? Because the people were unable to distinguish between right and wrong and good and evil. It was, therefore, necessary that religious influence should be brought to bear on them so that their heart could be reformed. Religion should be enlisted in the task of regenerating China . . . the state could not make any progress, however perfect its political system might be, so long as the people were evil-minded. His own rôle in this country might be compared to that of the road maker. He wished to reform the heart of the people so as to make political progress possible.

Gandhiji is a road-maker in India as the Panchan Lama is in China.

These three Orientals give a message not only for India and China but also for the Occident. Untouchability, caste-prejudice and irreligion flourish in the West as much as in the East, however different their manifestations. Often habits breed hypocrisy and beliefs blind us to truths. Whether the evils of caste in Hinduism are condemned by the Christian, he fails to see similar evils of class distinction in Christendom. The human consciousness must be exorcised of the demon of pride who lives in a citadel built of creedal dogmas.

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